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The Genealogical Jigsaw Puzzle- A Missing Piece? 
The Right to Know for A.I.D Children? 
This paper examines current UK legal regulation relating to the provisiOn of 
genetic background information to children born by donor insemination (01) and 
argues in favour of changes to the existing law - the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990. The proposals for reform suggested in this paper would allow 
for Regulations to sanction the disclosure of both non-identifying and identifying 
information to DI children. These Regulations and the form they might take have 
been the subject of a recent government Consultation Paper, the response to which has 
been a majority in favour of the enactment of Regulations to allow disclosure of both 
types of information to donor offspring. This paper proposes that donor offspring 
should be granted the right to be told of their status and the right to receive 
information about their genetic background, whilst they are still children. 
This paper analyses the issues raised in the Consultation Paper and the arguments 
for and against the enactment of Regulations. Existing sociological and 
psychological research demonstrates the importance of genetic heritage information 
for the development of a child's identity. The provision of genealogical information 
can also be justified by reference to the child's right to an identity under international 
human rights law. However, the concepts of secrecy and anonymity have thus far 
influenced this area of law allowing for the protection of the rights of the social 
parents of DI children and the donors respectively. Therefore, this paper advocates 
that the concept of openness should feature heavily in any future legislative measures. 
Based on evidence from other jurisdictions, this paper argues for the enactment of 
Regulations in the near future to allow for the protection of the rights of the DI child, 
which have until now been unjustifiably overlooked by the UK legislature. 
January 2004 
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L Introduction to A.H.D. 
Children born by means of artificial insemination by donation 1 in the UK are in an 
unfortunate position. Many are unaware of the nature of their conception and almost 
all of them have no idea about their correct genetic background. This is because, 
under current UK legislation, AID children2 are denied the right to be informed of 
their status and the right to receive any information about their true genealogical 
background. 3 
Assisted conception is not a new phenomenon,4 although this does not prevent it 
from being referred to as one of the "new reproductive technologies. "5 AID is 
thought to have been increasingly practised in the UK since the 1950's, but it has only 
been regulated by law since the early 1990's.6 The practice is now generally widely 
accepted by the medical profession, the law and the public at large. What seems to 
have remained alien in some circles is the proposition that AID children should have 
the right to an identity. 
This paper shall argue that, where a child is born following gamete and/or embryo 
donation by a third party, they should be entitled to be informed of their status and 
1 Hereinafter referred to as AID. Also known as donor assisted conception, assisted conception by 
donation and gamete/embryo transfer by donation. However, the term 01 (donor insemination) is 
preferred to avoid confusion with the AIDS virus. The acronyms "AID" and "01" shall be the main 
terms of reference in this paper. 
1 Also referred to as "Dl children" and "donor offspring". 
3 The terms "genetic" and "genealogical" shall be used throughout this paper to describe the link 
between the donor/genetic parent and the donor offspring. These terms are to be prefened to the word 
"biological" because, in instances of egg donation, a biological link can be established during gestation, 
despite the absence of a genetic link between the canying mother and the donor offspring. 
4 The first instance of human donor insemination allegedly occuned in 1884 at Jefferson Medical 
College in the United States- seeR. Snowden & G. Mitchell, The Artificial Family: a consideration of 
artificial insemination by donor, London: Allen & Unwin, 1981, pl3. 
5 See M. McNeil, I. Varcoe & S. Yearley (eds), The New Reproductive Technologies, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1990. 
6 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 - hereinafter HFEA - (in force August 1, 1991 ). 
Section 5 provides for the establishment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (the 
HFE Authority), responsible for the licensing (HFEA, ss 9-22) of centres providing "treatment 
services" (defined in HFEA, s 2(1)). 
have the right to access both non-identifying and identifying information in relation to 
that third party.7 
It is estimated that there are approximately 1 500 - 2 200 live births8 in the UK 
each year as a result of treatments using donated gametes and/or embryos. 9 
Consequently, around 18 000- 26 000 01 children have been born so far since the 
inception of the HFEA 1990. Add to this the number of children born prior to the 
advent of legal regulation (a figure which is impossible to quantify) 10 and we have a 
significant section of the population who have no means of knowing the complete 
h b h . . II tmt a out t e1r conception. Under the HFEA 1990, DI children merely have 
limited rights with regard to acquiring information relating to possible consanguinity 
with someone they intend to marry 12 and with regard to issues concerning inherited 
genetic illnesses and conditions, 13 meaning that more and more children are being 
brought into this world each year without the necessary genetic information that 
would allow them to fill in the missing pieces of their ''genealogical jigsaw puzzle. "14 
Admittedly, this area of law involves a number of extremely contentious issues and 
has been hotly debated over the past two decades. 15 The debate, to be further 
7 This paper accepts that, if there is a right to receive information about one's genetic background, there 
will be a corresponding right not to receive information. It is not assumed that every DI child will 
automatically want to know about their genealogical background, but they should at least have the 
choice. 
8 
"Live births" can include stillbirths and neonatal births - see HFEA website -
www.hfea.gov.uk/Forpatients/PatientsGuidetoDI/HowtoreadtheDidatatables. 
9 HFEA Annual Report 2001 (I April 2000- 31 March 2001). During this time there were nearly 
3 500 01 treatments and over 800 live DI births. 
10 Estimated at approximately 12 000 donor offspring prior to the 1990 Act - DOH Press Release, 
Donor Conceived Children to Get More Information about Donors, 28 January 2003 -
www.info.doh.gov.uk/dohlintpress.nsf/page/2003-0037?0penDocument. 
11 Added to this figure is the number of children born by so-called "D.I.Y." AID, not covered by HFEA 
regulation. 
12 HFEA, ss 31 ( 6) and (7). 
13 Ibid, s 35. 
14 Donor offspring are currently the only group of children to have genetic origin information legally 
restricted in such a way. 
15 In 1982, the government appointed a Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Mary Warnock (now 
Baroness Warnock) to, "consider{ation of} recent and potential developments in medicine and science 
related to human fertilisation and emb1yology, " p4. The Committee reported in 1984- Department of 
Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inqui1y into Human Fertilisation and 
5 
examined in this paper, has centred on the apparent conflict between the medical need 
to treat those who are infertile by means of AID, and the increasing awareness that the 
interests ofthe DI child need to be recognised, following the dawn of a new children's 
. h 16 ng ts era. 
Promisingly, there does seem to have been some acknowledgement, on the part of 
the government, that this issue is ripe for reconsideration. In December 2001, the 
Department of Health published a Consultation Paper examining a number of issues 
with regard to the position of DI children. 17 
The Consultation Paper set out to consider: 
• some of the arguments for and against making Regulations 18 to specify what 
information should be given to offspring born using donated gametes or 
embryos; 
• the non-identifying information which might be available m the case of 
existing donors; 
• whether a greater range of information might be collected and provided about 
future donors; 
• and whether, for future donors only, identifying information should be 
collected and provided and, whether this should be a requirement in all cases, 
Emb1yology (The Warnock Report), Cmnd 9414, London: HMSO 1984. In 1986, the DHSS issued a 
Consultation Paper on this issue, followed by a White Paper and then the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Bill, introduced into the House of Lords in 1989, enacted as the HFEA 1990, almost a 
decade after the initial Committee of Inquiry was set up. 
16 The provisions of the HFEA 1990, relating to the interests of the Dl child, stand in stark contrast to 
other child-orientated legislation - e.g. the Adoption Act 1976, the Children Act 1989 and the 
Adoption and Children Act 200 I. 
17 Department of Health, Donor Information Consultation: Providing information about gamete or 
embryo donors. London: HMSO, 200 I. 
18 T.his refers to HFEA s 3!(3)(a), wherein provision was made for both non-identifying 
(retrospectively and prospectively disclosed) and identifying (prospectively disclosed) information to 
be made available to 01 children born after the Act's inception. This information was to be specified 
by Regulations enacted at a later date, but thus far no Regulations have been made. 
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or donors should be able to specifY whether they wished to be identified or 
not.l9 
The points of inquiry of the Consultation Paper provide a good basis for the issues 
to be considered within this paper and, in response to the issues raised above, this 
paper would make the following recommendations: 
• Regulations should be enacted to provide donor offspring with more 
information about their genetic background than is currently available.20 
This suggestion is based firstly, on the fact that provision was originally made 
under the HFEA 1990 for Regulations to be enacted; therefore the possibility 
of further information being disclosed was considered during the drafting of 
the 1990 Act. Secondly, some non-identifying information is currently held 
on the HFEA Register of Information,21 again evidence for the proposition that 
the provision of information was originally contemplated. Thirdly, the 
Authority already advises all donors that, although no information about them 
may be currently given to any DI children resulting from their donation, this 
may become possible in the future. 22 Therefore, if such Regulations were 
enacted, they could not be deemed to be retrospective or contravening the rule 
of law, as the donors have already been advised that the provision of such 
information could later be entrenched in law. Finally, the HFEA came into 
force in the early 1990's; the provisions therein specified that, if any 
19 The Consultation period ended in July 2002; the summary of responses has since been published and 
the Department of Health is undertaking further research into the issue. 
20 Under section 31 HFEA, the Authority has a legal duty to tell adults who apply to them whether they 
were born as a result of donation. Some commentators have suggested that this is akin to the provision 
of non-identifying information- E. Haimes, Recreating the Family? Policy considerations relating to 
the "New" Reproductive Technologies, in op cit, McNeil, Varcoe & Yearley (eds), fn 5. 
21 Collected through the HFEA Donor Information Form (91) 4. 
22 The HFE Authority advises donors that, "[I]n the jilfure Parliament may decide that some details 
may be given to [children resulting fimn your donation} if they apply to the Authority," - HFEA 
leaflet, "Sperm and Egg Donors and the Law" (December 1992). 
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information were to be made available, this would not happen until a DI child 
reached the age of 16, the first instance of this being 2007. The year is now 
2004 and arguably opinions on this subject have altered.23 
o The non-identifying information currently held on the H.JFIEA !Register 
should be made available to existing [)I children. This is based on 
evidence that shows that this type of information is important in tem1s of the 
Dl child's development of their identity and therefore forms a fundamental 
part of their actual right to an identity.24 However, empirical evidence shows 
that the collection of this information by the licensed treatment centres has 
often been inconsistent and inadequate.25 Therefore, this paper also proposes 
that the provision of non-identifying information (specifically, in the form of a 
"pen portrait") should be made a compulsory part of the donation process -
again justifiable on the basis that non-identifying information about the donor 
can form a crucial part of the child's development of an identity. 26 Evidence 
shows that the collection of this type of information does not occur in every 
instance of donation; 27 therefore compulsory provision of this information 
would avoid an inequitable scenario whereby some DI children could access 
the information whilst others could not. 
23 According to a recent MORI poll (commissioned by The Children's Society - June 2002) there is 
strong public support in favour of granting identity rights to 01 offspring, albeit when they reach 18 
years of age. 80% of the public would support donor offspring having an automatic right to know 
about their genealogical history- www.mori.com/polls/2002/cs.html. 
24 Post, chapters 2 and 3. 
25 See S. MacLean & M. MacLean, Keeping secrets in assisted reproduction - the tension between 
donor anonymity and the need ofthe child for information CFLQ 8(3) [1996] 243. 
26 S. Wilson, Identity, Genealogy and the Social Fami~v: The Case of Donor Insemination IJLPF II 
(1997) 270. 
27 Op cit, MacLean & MacLean, fn 25, p245. 
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e Identifying information regarding the donor should be made available to 
the DI child, both on a retrospective and prospective basis. It is accepted 
that this proposition goes beyond the terms of inquiry of the Consultation 
Paper; however, the provision of identifying information in both of these 
instances is doubly justified because of the necessity of protecting the Dl 
child's identity rights and also in recognition of their need for a complete and 
ongoing correct medical history. 28 It is further accepted that the provision of 
such information may conflict with the rights of the other parties involved, i.e. 
the social parent(s) and the genetic parent(s),29 e.g. their rights to respect for 
their private and family lives. 30 Therefore later chapters will examine how a 
balance might best be struck between the rights of all parties, whilst 
recognising that future legal regulation must begin to take greater account of 
the rights of the 01 child, if not place them as the highest priority. 
Further to the proposals for reform suggested above, this paper shall examine how 
these rights of access to information can be attributed to donor offspring whilst they 
are still children; justifiable firstly, on the grounds that this information forms a 
significant part of their right to an identity31 and secondly, that evidence from 
adoption circles shows that this information should be provided as early in life as 
'bl 32 poss1 e. 
28 Post. chapters 2 and 3. 
29 In this paper the tenn "social parent" will be used to describe those who bring the child up; "genetic 
parent" will be used for those who have a definite genetic link with the child. 
30 Under Article 8, European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 
31 See chapter 3 for an explanation of the identity rights of children under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC), Articles 7 and 8. 
32 
"When knowledge [of adoption} is delayed to adolescence or adult age, the feeling of "rejection" 
seems to be infinite~v greater than when revelation takes place in earlier years. It appears that when 
knowledge of adoption comes ear(v -possibly before the age of 8 or 10- there is time for the trauma 
to heal where accepting and cherishing relationships prevail, " J. Triseliotis, In Search of Origins, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, pl55. 
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Another important issue relates to how this information could be made effective, 
given that whilst Dl offspring are still children they are under the control of their 
social parent(s) and that it is they who will be the ones to decide whether or not to 
inform their child of the true nature of their conception. 33 Whilst it is acknowledged 
that compulsory disclosure on the part of the social parents may be deemed heavy-
handed and difticult to enforce, it must be recognised that, without the cooperation of 
the social parents, it will be almost impossible to extend the rights of DI children. 
Therefore, this paper will examine the feasibility of a legal mechanism for enforcing 
those rights, possibly in the production of an altered birth certificate for all donor 
offspring, thereby providing evidence of their status as soon as they are born. 
Chapters 2 and 3 shall attempt to establish that the Dl child's interest in genetic 
origin information is a fundamental constituent of their right to an identity and 
consequently the rights of the DI child should be placed much higher on the legal and 
political agenda. Unfortunately, there is a significant lack of empirical evidence 
concerning the development of AID children, given the secrecy and anonymity 
surrounding this subject. However, there is research in this area34 and also from the 
field of adoption35 -often viewed as analogous to the position of DI children- which 
strongly suggests that DI children have a "psychological need"36 to know about 
information relating to their genetic background, as well as an inherent interest in 
33 Research shows that many DI parents choose not to tell their DI child about the circumstances of 
their birth - S. Cook, R. Go lombok, A. Bish & C. Murray, Keeping Secrets: A study of parental 
attitudes towards telling about donor insemination, Clinical and Health Research Centre, City 
University, London, 1995. 
34 A.J. Turner & A. Coyle, What does it mean to be a donor offspring? The identity experiences of 
adults conceived through donor insemination and the implications for counselling and therapy (2002) 
15 HR 2041. 
35 J. Owusu-Bempah & A. Coyle, Socio-genea/ogical connectedness, attachment theoty and childcare 
practice CFSW 1997 (2) 199. 
36 Op cit, Triseliotis, fn 32. 
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knowing about their genetic background for medical purposes, relating to their 
possible predispositions to hereditary illnesses and genetic conditions. 37 
However, it must be acknowledged that the issue of granting rights to donor 
offspring is an extremely contentious one: the 01 child does not exist in a vacuum and 
their interests need to be weighed against the rights of the other parties involved -
primarily, the social parent(s) and the donor- both of whom are assumed as having a 
strong interest in the retention of the concepts of secrecy and anonymity respectively 
- concepts that thus far seem to have heavily influenced this area of law and 
medicine. 
Therefore, chapter 4 will examine the position of the social parents in relation to 
the question of whether or not the AID child should have the right to be told about 
their status. The argument that there is a need for complete secrecy in AID has 
consistently been used to protect the social parents' rights to privacy and the 
protection of the stability of their family life. 38 However, the basis of this 
justification is becoming increasingly tenuous: firstly, due to a growing awareness of 
the importance of recognising the rights of children in general;39 secondly, because of 
the way in which the concept of openness has been gradually embraced within other 
similar areas of law, such as adoption;40 and finally, because of a gradual acceptance 
of value pluralism within the family sphere,41 i.e. the acknowledgement that families 
37 S. Simpson, T111th and the Child: a genetic perspective in E. Blyth, M. Crawshaw & J. Speirs (eds), 
Truth and the Child 10 Years On: information exchange in donor assisted conception. Birmingham: 
British Association of Social Workers, 1998. 
38 Article 8, ECHR. 
39 Demonstrated by the inception of the UNCRC 1989. 
40 C. Bridge, Changing the Nature ofAdoption: law reform in England and New Zealand ( 1993) 13 LS 
81, p92; N. Lowe, The changing face of adoption- the gift/donation model versus the contract/services 
model [1997] CFLQ 371; also B. Lindley, Open adoption- is the door ajar? [1997] CFLQ 115. 
41 Post, chapter 3, p38. 
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can be formed in a variety of ways and need not necessarily conform to any 
preconceptions regarding a "natural" or "normal" family structure.42 
By way of a brief introduction, the assisted reproductive technologies (ART's) 
including AID/DI, were originally developed by the medical profession for the 
treatment of infertile couples;43 this is still the primary justification for the retention of 
AID practices. The supposed advantage of AID over adoption for infertile couples is 
that the process allows them to have "a child of their own. ·A4 In the majority of 
instances of DI the child will be the genetic offspring of at least one of the social 
parents45 and, even if this is not the case, then the techniques involved will always 
allow the child to pass as the child of the couple. However, the medicalisation of this 
area has led to a focus on the needs of the social parents- as patients -with the DI 
child being seen as a successful "cure. "46 The apparent prerequisite for a high birth 
rate is therefore seen to be the necessity to maintain the numbers of those willing to 
donate; something which the medical community has consistently argued cannot be 
achieved without donor anonymity.47 Therefore, following on from these arguments, 
chapter 5 will attempt to investigate and counter the proposition that anonymity is in 
the best interests of all of those involved in the DI process.48 
41 For a discussion of the history of families, see B.M. Dickens, Reproductive technology and the 
"new" fami~y in E. Sutherland & A. McCall Smith (eds), Family Rights, Edinburgh University Press, 
1990. 
43 Although the word "infertile" is commonly used, infertility is actually very rare and means a total 
absence of reproductive function. Most people seeking fertility treatment have a varying degree of 
"sub-fertility". However, within this paper the terms "infertile" and "infertility" shall be used to 
include "sub-fertile" and "sub-fertility". 
44 C. Overall, Ethics and Human Reproduction: A feminist ana~vsis, London: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 
pl45. 
45 Gamete donation occurs much more frequently than embryo donation; on average donor embryos 
account for only 1% of successful donations, HFEA Annual Report, 1993. 
46 See op cit, Overall, fn 44, for a discussion of the way in which current legal regulation seems to 
focus on the language of disease and cure in relation to AID. 
47 P. Braude et a!, !Iuman Fertilisation and Emb1yo Bill goes to report stage ( 1990) 300 BMJ 1410. 
48 Considered necessary to protect the donor from any legal responsibility towards the child and to, 
"minimise the intervention of the third party into the family," op cit, The Warnock Report, fn 15, p 25. 
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At present, donor anonymity is the accepted norm in the UK. The maintenance of 
donor anonymity has long been justified by the medical community on the basis that, 
without such a provision, the number of willing donors would fall substantially and 
therefore openness and frankness in relation to AID would not be in the best interests 
of any of the parties, because fewer donations could take place.49 However, prima 
facie, there seems to be a body of evidence to suggest that the contrary is true. 
Recent studies have shown that, if anonymity were to be removed, a number of 
donors might no longer donate, but many would still do so.50 
AID can take place using donated sperm, eggs or embryos; however, it is 
conceptions as a result of sperm donation that occur most frequently. 51 As a result, 
much of contemporary discussion tends to focus on male sperm donors. Evidence 
shows that there are differences in the attitudes, motivation and expectations of male 
and female donors and that, overall, it may be mainly sperm donors who demonstrate 
the greatest resistance towards more openness. Therefore, this paper will focus on 
how future Regulations could take account of this fact, in order to encourage more 
male donors to accept the possibility of their identities being revealed to the children 
whom they have helped to create, on the basis of that child's fundamental right to an 
identity. However, it is again recognised that this must be balanced against the fact 
that the donor/genetic parent also has the right to respect for their confidentialit/2 and 
privacy53 and the right to respect for their family life. 54 
49 S. Cook, R. Golombok, A. Bish & C. Murray, Disclosure of donor insemination; parental attitudes 
American Journal ofOrthopsychiatry 65(4) (1995) 549. 
50 A. Kirkland et a!, Comparison ol attitudes of donors and recipients to oocyte donation (1992) 7 HR 
355; J.N. Robinson et al, Attitudes ol donors and recipients to gamete donation ( 1991) 6 HR 307; see 
in general, E. Blyth, Inj'ertility and Assisted Conception: Practice Issues for Counsellors (1995) 
Birmingham: British Association of Social Workers, p67. 
51 Estimated at approximately 93% of all live births. 
52 See HFEA Code of Practice, 4'h cdn, London: HFEA, July 1998. 
53 Article 8, ECHR. 
54 Ibid. 
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In general, it is the assertion of this thesis that the rights of the 01 child cannot be 
relegated merely by alluding to the supposed benefits of the preservation of secrecy 
and anonymity, for the sake of the social parents and the donor respectively. Future 
government policy and legal regulation needs to become much more focussed on the 
needs of the DI child, by acknowledging that the current protection of the DI child's 
interests, in the shape of the section 13( 5) "welfare"55 clause, is woefully inadequate 
and requires a substantial re-evaluation. Moreover, the government needs to move 
away from the traditional view of the oft-referred to "nuclear family" as being the 
prevalent model. The institution of the family in today's society is extremely 
diverse56 and what is needed is a fresh sociological approach to the notion of the 
family, to allow for different models of family life, including AID-generated families, 
to gain recognition, respect and legitimacy. Outdated notions of the conceptualisation 
of the family cannot be allowed to detract from the protection of the rights of the AID 
child. 
In the words of one donor offspring: 
"! feel that [these] genetic connections are very1 important to me, socially, 
emotionally, medically and even spiritually. I believe it to be no exaggeration that . .. 
. . information will assist me in forming a fuller sense of self or identity and answer 
questions that I have been asking for a long time . ... .I feel intense grief and loss for 
the fact that I do not know my genetic father and hisfamily. "57 
55 
"account must be taken of' the welfare of' any child who may be born of the treatment (including the 
need of that child for a father)," HFEA, s 13(5) (emphasis added). For an in-depth discussion, see G. 
Douglas, Assisted Reproduction and the Welfare of the Child (1993) CLP 53. 
56 Evidence of this can be seen in ECHR jurisprudence from the past two decades. For further 
discussion see C. Warbrick, The Structure of Article 8 [1998] I EHRLR 32, p33. 
57 See the comments of Joanna Rose in R (Rose& Anothe1) v Secretmy of State for Health & Human 
Fertilisation and Emb1yology Authority [2002] EWHC (Admin). 
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It is imperative that the legislature and the courts use the period following the 
Consultation exercise as an opportunity to listen to the voices of those donor offspring 
who are arguing for the right to receive information abouf their genetic origins. The 
government cannot continue to ignore the academic evidence and opinion, which 
conclusively shows that many 01 children have a desperate need and desire for this 
information. Surely it is time to give 01 children the right to fill in the missing piece 
of their very own "genealogical jigsaw puzzle"? 
15 
2. The Rights of the Clllildl 
This paper argues in favour of the DI child's right to be informed of their status 
and their right to receive information about their genetic background, justified by 
reference to their right to an identity. 1 Throughout this research these two rights will 
be shown to be inextricably linked - the donor offspring's right to receive 
genealogical information would be wholly ineffective without the corollary right to be 
told of their status - and vice versa. However, on a theoretical level, it seems 
sensible to examine these two rights independently of each other, thereby 
demonstrating that the justifications for these two rights may be formed on separate 
grounds, given the fact that the rights may take effect at different stages of the donor 
offspring's "childhood".2 
By way of introduction, it must first be recognised how important it is to accept 
that children actually possess rights, or at least fundamental interests that should be 
recognised in law, even though there remains significant controversy as to what a 
"right" is. 3 Without rights children can easily become marginalised by the adults 
who shape their world - this could be said to be particularly true in relation to AID 
children, given that, within legal and medical discourse they are often viewed as 
"property" or "objects" that complete the family, rather than as human beings and 
legal entities in themselves.4 Furthermore, as Eekelaar5 points out, because AID 
children are created by the means of a deliberate act of social policy, then there is an 
1 Articles 7 & 8, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). 
2 Post, chapter 3, pp46-50. 
3 For a discussion of the problem of children's rights, see W.N .R. Lucy, Controversy About Children's 
Rights in D. Freestone (ed), Children and the Law, Hull University Press, 1990, p213. 
4 See further M. Kellmer-Pringle, The Needs of Children, London: Hutchinson, 1975, pp69-70 - "a 
baby completes a family, rather like a TV set or a fridge . . . a child belongs to his parents like their 
other possessions over which they may exercise exclusive rights. " 
5 1. Eekelaar, The Importance of thinking that Children Have Rights IJLF 6 ( 1992) 221, p231. 
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even greater responsibility on the state to protect the human rights of the donor 
offspring. Current provisions under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990, relating to the "welfare" of the AID child are wholly inadequate6 and nowhere 
in the Act is there explicit reference to the "rights" of the DI child. The only way to 
address this untenable situation is to re-evaluate current legislation and grant effective 
legal identity rights to donor offspring, justified by reference to the theoretical 
discussion set out below. 
Some commentators would counter this suggestion by questioning whether rights 
really are important for children; in the case of AID children, why should they need 
further rights when their "welfare" is already clearly legislated for under the HFEA 
1990? Critics might also argue that the importance of legal rights in this context has 
been exaggerated and that children's immediate interests lie in more altruistic, albeit 
paternalistic, notions of love, nurture and compassion. Those who favour this 
argument tend to adopt a laissez-faire approach to children's rights. For example, 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit argue that the only right a child has is to autonomous 
parents, thereby requiring minimal intervention by the state into the private family 
sphere. 7 However, this notion assumes that adults always relate to children in terms 
of what they consider to be in their "best interests," and within the AID parent/child 
relationship, the separate interests of the parent and the child can often be viewed as 
being in opposition to each other. 8 Therefore this paper supports the proposition that 
state intervention within the private AID family sphere is justified and warranted: 
firstly, because of the "public" nature of the AID child's conception; secondly, 
because of the state's role in the way that an AID child's birth is registered and 
6 HFEA, s 13(5). For a full discussion of the effects of this section see post. chapter 3, pp34-38. See 
also G. Douglas, Assisted Reproduction and the Welfare of the Child CLP (1993) 53. 
7 J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, New York: Free Press, 
1973. 
s Post, chapters 3-5. 
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thirdly, because the collection and retention of information regarding the AID child is 
maintained by a state agency - the HFE Authority. The UK government cannot 
justifiably continue to refuse to recognise and respect the identity rights of AID 
children. 
Indeed, children's rights in general have begun to gam recognition at both 
domestic and international level. Developments in international law can be traced 
back to the United Nations Year of the Child 1979, subsequently bolstered by the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. Domestic law has seen 
the introduction of more child-centric UK legislation, such as the Children Act 1989 
and child-orientated jurisprudence such as the Gillick decision. 9 However, the 
theoretical justifications for the ascription of legal rights to children are still hotly 
debated amongst legal philosophers and jurists. 10 
Prima facie, by reference to the analysis offered by some commentators, it seems 
mistaken to ascribe rights to children at all. 11 According to the "will" or "power" 
theory, a right is a normative capacity that the right-bearer may choose to exercise 
over others, who themselves have a correlative duty to comply with the exercise of 
the right-holder's will. 12 Many legal philosophers claim that children do not have the 
relevant capacities of choice to claim these rights and therefore children have no 
" I . . h " 13 h c azm-ng ts w atsoever. Some "will" theorists avoid this assertion by 
suggesting that a proxy, such as a parent, may exercise the right on behalf of the child. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, it must be acknowledged that this cannot be 
9 Gillick v West N01j'olk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [ 1986] AC 112. 
10 See W. G. Paton, pp285-90 in W.G. Paton & D.P. Derham (eds), A Text-Book of Jurisprudence, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972, cited in N. MacCormick, Children's Rights: A test-case for 
theories of right, in Legal Reasoning and Legal The01y, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, p 154. 
11 Op cit, MacCorrnick, fn 10, pl54. 
12 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
13 See W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, Yale University Press, 1919, for a full 
explanation of what is meant by a "claim-right". 
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said to be a full right, because it is the proxy who is the right-holder and they who 
possess the power to exercise or waive the right. 14 The process of the child choosing 
to exercise their right is missing, i.e. the child lacks the autonomy of a right-holder. 
Furthermore, if the proxy was to exercise the right on behalf of the child, then it 
would be the adult proxy (generally a "natural" parent - in the case of AID, the social 
parent) who would represent the child's interest in his/her own welfare. The proxy 
version of the "will" theory does not address the proposition that there might be a 
multiple number of conflicting interests at issue; neither does it address the fact that 
the adult decision-maker might not represent the "best interests" of the child whom 
they are making the decision for. 15 
There is an extended version of the "will" theory, which suggests that rights are 
also related to a person's capacity for choice and rational action, in that all rights must 
be linked to the exercise of a person's self-determination, because rights have the 
function of protecting these capacities. Therefore, it is because human beings have 
the power of reasoned self-determination that they can have rights. 16 According to 
this fuller version of the "will" theory, children would only have rights if they could 
demonstrate their capacities for reasoned decision-making and willed conduct. 
However, this theory may be criticised on two bases. Firstly, because it seems 
inherently wrong to deny children's rights purely on the basis that they do not "fit" 
with the ''will" theory; for example, if we consider something as fundamental as the 
right to life, it seems unacceptable that this right should be denied to a 6 month old 
baby for any reason whatsoever, purely on the theoretical basis that they do not have 
the will and capacity to exercise their right to life. Secondly, if we consider the 
14 T.D. Campbell, The Rights ol the Minor: as person, as child. as juvenile, as jitture adult 6 IJLF 
( 1992) I. 
15 See further M.D.A. Freeman, Freedom and the welfare state: child-rearing, parental autonomy and 
state inten1ention (1983) Journal of Social Welfare Law 70. 
16 Op cit, MacCormick, fn 10. 
19 
possibility of a children's rights theory that takes account of "childhood" as consisting 
of a number of varying stages, e.g. infancy, adolescence etc., then it may be possible 
to ascribe rights to AID children under the age of majority, given the proposition that 
children at the adolescent/juvenile stage of their "childhood" could certainly be said to 
have the capacity for rational thought and autonomous behaviour. 
However, it is generally accepted that the "interest" theory presents a much more 
attractive justification for the general assertion that children should be granted full 
legal rights. 17 According to the "interest" theory, children have rights if their 
interests are the basis for having rules requiring others to behave in certain ways to 
protect the child's fundamental interests. Therefore children could be said to have 
"interests" to be protected before they have the necessary will to assert those 
"interests." 
It would be sufficient if there were ways and means of pointing to a child's 
fundamental interests, i.e. there is no assertion that interests have to be connected to a 
rational decision-making capacity. Some "will" theorists counter the "interest" 
theory's application to children's rights as simply reducing rights to assertions of 
existing duties. 18 Further, they have difficulty with the fact that the "interest" theory 
seems far too broad, in that there seems to be no mechanism for identifying the actual 
features of rights-creating interests, i.e. which interest would give rise to distinctive 
rights and which would not. 
To a certain extent theorists accept the stalemate between the "will" and 
"interest" theories, particularly in terms of children's rights, 19 although the "interest" 
theory is generally supposed to be a better fonnulation for the justification of 
17 For further discussion, seeN. Simmonds, Centra/Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice. Lmvs and Right, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986. 
18 Ibid. 
19 P. Jones, Rights. London: Macmillan, 1994, ch 20. 
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children's rights. 20 What is important is that many commentators believe that 
children's fundamental rights definitely should be protected; the disagreement arises 
over the most appropriate way of achieving this. This chapter shall go on to 
demonstrate that, in actual fact, both theories may be employed to fully delineate the 
rights of the AID child, firstly to be informed of their status and secondly, their right 
to receive information about their genetic background. 
Let us look first at whether DI children could be said to have a moral right to either 
of these interests. There is still a great deal of debate over the exact nature of moral 
rights - particularly fundamental moral rights, to which overriding importance is 
attributed within most theories. Doubt could be cast as to the actual existence of 
moral, non-positive rights, because these moral rights appear to require the prior 
existence of independent, naturalistic, moral rules dictating what are and are not moral 
rights. 
Turning first to the AID child's right to be informed of their status. With 
reference to MacCormick's "interest" theory, he speaks of a child's fundamental 
right to be nurtured, cared for and loved and explicitly refers to this as a moral righe' 
- one that can be claimed primarily aginst the "natural" i.e. social parents of the AID 
child.22 If we go on to re-phrase the Dl child's right to be informed of their status as 
a right to the truth and/or a right not to be deceived or lied to (by their social parents), 
then this could be seen to be analogous to MacCormick's concept of a right to be 
loved, nurtured and cared for, or at least a component of this right. Alternatively, if 
we examine the right purely in terms of the right to be told the truth, then there is an 
argument that this could be deemed to be a fundamental moral right in and of itself. 
20 Op cit, MacCormick, fn 10. 
21 Op cit, MacCormick, fn 10, p155. 
22 Ibid, p 156. 
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Furthermore, if we refer to Eekelaar's categorisation of rights23 then we could 
describe this right to the truth as a "basic" interese4 because it directly relates to the 
physical, emotional and intellectual care of the AID child. Eekelaar considers these 
"basic" interests to be pre-eminent to all other interests, therefore providing 
justification for acknowledging a fundamental moral right of the AID child to be 
informed of their status. 
Concerning the question as to whether the AID child has a moral right to receive 
information about their genetic background, this may warrant a different approach. 
Campbell25 suggests that moral rights can be viewed in terms of reasons for 
attributing positive rights to individuals, centring on the identification of certain 
interests that are important in and of themselves. Therefore, it could be possible to 
argue that DI children should have the right to information about their genetic 
background based, not on a moral right as such, but on a moral right rationale. In 
other words, this interest could be considered by society as being so significant that it 
ought to be given priority wherever possible. Allied to this is the notion that this 
could form the basis of a "developmental" interest within Eekelaar's categories of 
rights;26 such a right entails the promotion of an individual's potential to be developed 
so that they are able to enter adulthood as far as possible without disadvantage. It is 
arguable that withholding information on genetic origins could harm a child's chances 
of a stable emotional and psychological development of their sense of self. 27 On the 
basis of these arguments it seems possible to assert the moral rights of AID children 
to receive information about their genealogical background. 
23 J. Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children's Rights ( 1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 161 
24 Ibid, ppl71-172. 
25 Op cit, Campbell, fn 14. 
16 Op cit, Eekelaar, fu 23, p 173. 
17 Eekelaar acknowledges that "developmental" and "autonomy" interests may need to be 
compromised in relation to the rights of others, such as the social and genetic parents, as opposed to 
"basic" interests, which are regarded as being pre-eminent. 
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In furtherance of this analysis, we shall now refer closely to Campbell's account of 
a child's rights as "person, child, juvenile andfuture adult. "28 His account seems to 
demonstrate that it is possible to allege a justification for the two rights at issue on the 
basis of the concept of "childhood" representing a range of different states of being a 
"child" and that the two rights might be brought into effect at different stages of this 
"childhood," in order to fully and effectively protect the rights of the AID child. 
In this context, it seems to be a natural assumption on the part of many legal 
theorists that children are human beings and that, if human rights are acknowledged as 
being universal, then they should be applied equally to both adults and children. A 
young child's main interests relate to the love, care and affection provided by their 
primary carers - for AID children this is their social parents. 29 The right to be told 
the truth about their status is an important part of this stage of "childhood", 
particularly considering that evidence shows that this should occur as early as possible 
in a child's life. 30 However, some theorists would dispute that the AID child has 
such a right, given the fact that at this stage in their lives, they cannot exercise their 
claim-right to force another person to carry out their correlative duty by telling them 
the truth; neither can they relieve that person of this duty. 31 The most appropriate 
way of attributing such a right to DI children would therefore be by reference to the 
"interest" theory, i.e. that donor offspring should have the right to be told about their 
status because they have a fundamental interest in such a right, as it relates to the 
protection of their "basic" interests. 
However, despite the fact that MacCormick's theory incorporates a measure of 
patemalism, it must be stressed that adopting the "interest" theory in relation to this 
28 Op cit, Campbell, fn 14. 
29 Post, chapter 3, p48 et seq. 
30 J. Triseliotis, In Search a,( Origins, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 
31 Op cit, MacConnick, fn 10, pl56. 
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right should not necessarily entail an automatic acceptance of the "best interests" or 
"welfare" test for determining the way in which the right should be exercised. The 
reasons for this being, firstly, this test has often been used to actually deny the rights 
of DI children to information on their origins, as it was considered to be in the best 
interests of the child not to disclose this information; 32 secondly, because it should be 
recognised that children's rights need to be analysed in and of themselves, not merely 
as part of paternalistic, adult-centred concerns. 
Eekelaar33 and Freeman34 have argued that, m order to ascertain what is in a 
child's best interests there needs to be a hypothetical enquiry into what children 
would want, on the basis of what adults would have wanted for themselves as 
children. This argument seems far too idealistic, particularly in the AID context, and 
it is accepted that what probably happens in practice is that adult decision-making of 
this nature tends to reflect the value judgements of the adults, as has been suggested 
by Ruth Adler. 35 Possibly the best resolution to this issue may be to reformulate the 
notion of the "welfare" principle as one that gives, "priority to children's rights over 
those of parents (or others) in cases where they cannot be reconciled, "36 although this 
would not be an automatic assumption, as the balancing of interests would depend on 
the particular facts of each case. 
However, this paper concedes that the most important right for the younger AID 
child is the right to be told of their status - the right to genealogical information is not 
a necessarily useful part of the younger child's childhood, i.e. this right may be better 
32 Post, chapters 3-5. 
33 Op cit, Eekelaar, fn 23. See also J. Eekelaar, The Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: The 
Role of Dynamic Self-Determinism, in P. Alston (ed), The Best Interests of the Child, London: 
Clarendon Press, 1994. 
34 M. Freeman, The Moral Status of Children, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997. 
35 R. Adler, Taldng Juvenile Justice Serious~v. Scottish Academic Press, 1985. 
36 J. Eekelaar, The Wardship Jurisdiction, Children's Welfare and Parents' Rights ( 1991) I 07 LQR 
368, p389. 
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attributed to them at a later stage. Sociological and psychological evidence shows 
that both identifying and non-identifying information relating to a child's genetic 
identity becomes much more important during their adolescent years, when they are 
developing into their adult selves. 
Modern rights discourse has begun to recogmse that older children may have 
certain rights attributed to them on the basis that they have developed sufficient 
maturity to recognise, understand and assert these rights. Such an analysis allows for 
the acknowledgement of the significance of a transitional phase from "childhood" to 
"adulthood." At this juvenile stage, certain distinctive rights of the adolescent begin 
to emerge; these rights often include important elements relating to both childhood 
and adulthood. There is therefore scope for recognising a juvenile stage of human 
life, which could properly be brought within the sphere of children's rights. Indeed, 
this has already been demonstrated in other jurisdictions with relation to the rights of 
the AID child. The Swedish Act on Insemination 1985 makes explicit reference to 
the child's right to identifying information about their donor when they achieve 
sufficient "maturity" and it shall be argued within this paper that this right could be 
incorporated into UK law, using the benchmarks of maturity and competence as 
opposed to age. 37 
Child liberationists such as Farson38 and Holt39 would agree with this suggestion: 
firstly, because they would entirely refute the claim that children lack the same 
capacity as adults to hold rights; secondly, because they would point to the 
arbitrariness of any specific age-line that may be drawn between those who do and 
those who do not possess these rights. This leads to the conclusion that age alone is 
insufficient to warrant the denial or ascription of a right; in this way the ascription of 
37 Post, chapter 3. 
38 R. Farson, Birthrights, Penguin USA, 1978. 
39 J. Holt, Escape from Childhood, E.P. Dutton, 1974. 
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the right on the basis of perceived maturity or competence seems much more sensible 
and would fit with the justification of the "will" theory. 
Indeed in Gillick40 we can already see a firm commitment, on the part of the 
judiciary, to recognise the child as a developing and potentially rational decision-
maker in their own right. According to Lord Scarman: 
"! would hold as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or not 
their minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminated if and 
when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or 
her to understand fully what is proposed. It will be a question of fact. "41 
It needs to be acknowledged that, at a certain stage in their life, a child begins to 
develop a number of autonomy interests, i.e. they have the capacity for autonomous 
behaviour because they are sufficiently mature to select what they wish to have and 
not to have - this could therefore be true of AID children in relation to their decision 
to exercise a right to information on genetic origins or not. Therefore, it appears that 
the right to information would readily fit with the "will" theory, in that, such 
adolescents may be capable of rational and autonomous decision-making and may be 
able to exercise rights over others; although this right could equally be justified by 
reference to the "interest" theory. This would necessarily entail the existence of a 
correlative duty - in this case on the part of the state, I.e. the HFE Authority, to 
collect, retain and disseminate information relating to a 01 child's genetic 
background, in order to give effect to this positive legal right. 
40 Op cit, fn 9. 
41 Ibid. 
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However, autonomy on the part of the AID child need not lead to the dismissal of 
the proposition that these children are at a vulnerable stage in their lives and therefore 
may require some adult support in the exercise of their right to information. Minow 
suggests that there is, "something terribly lacking in rights for children that speak 
only of autonomy. "42 Therefore, although the child may have reached a stage in their 
lives where they can assert their rights, it is still a transitional phase for them and the 
practical implications of these rights being granted may entail continued adult 
support.43 
In conclusion therefore, it can be said that AID children are capable of being right-
holders, this assertion being justified in relation to both the "interest" and the "will" 
theory. However, this is not to say that their rights are absolute; it must be 
remembered that DI children do not exist in a vacuum and that their rights need to be 
balanced against those of the adults involved - the social parent(s) and the genetic 
parent(s). However, this paper will show that the result of such a balancing act 
would still be a strong argument in favour of AID children being granted the right to 
be told of their status and the right to receive information about their genetic 
background. 
42 Article 5, UNCRC makes explicit reference to the need for, "appropriate direction and guidance" 
from adults, in the exercise of Convention rights. 
43 
e.g. counselling and advice. 
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3. The A.I.D. Child 
The question: should AID/DI children be granted the legal right to be told about 
their status and the right to access both non-identifying and identifying information 
regarding their genetic background? The answer: yes. The justification: on the 
grounds that knowledge of their genetic origins constitutes a vital part of their identity 
and that such a right should be afforded to them on the basis of their fundamental 
right to an identity. 
1 Current UK Regulation 
In the UK, the regulation of AID/DI is founded on the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 1 and the HFE Authority Code of Practice. 2 Section 5 HFEA 
1990 provides for the establishment of the HFE Authority, 3 which is responsible for 
the licensing of treatment centres4 and the overseeing of all ART "treatment 
0 , 5 
serv1ces . 
However, the HFEA 1990 does not apply when AID conception takes place on a 
"do-it-yourself' basis,6 whereby a woman uses the sperm of a friend or acquaintance, 
by injection or full sexual intercourse, without the need for medical assistance. 
1 Hereinafter "HFEA". 
2 Hereinafter "the COP"; 41h edn, July 1998, London: HFEA. HFEA, s 25(1) requires the l-IFE 
Authority to, "maintain a code of practice of activities carried out in pursuance of a licence under this 
Act and the proper discharge of the fimctions of the person responsible and other persons to whom this 
licence applies." The COP is not legally binding but it is considered a major part of UK ART legal 
regulation and arguably establishes what a reasonable doctor should do (Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [ 1957] 2 All ER 118). Failure to comply with the Code may therefore 
constitute a breach of duty - see I. Kennedy & A. Grubb, Medical Law: Text with Materials, London: 
Butterworths, 1994, p793. 
3 Hereinafter "the Authority". 
4 HFEA, ss 9-22. 
5 Defined in HFEA, s 2( I). 
6 Only occurs with spe1m, not egg donation. 
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Situations like this occur most frequently where women have already been refused 
treatment in a licensed clinic, e.g. lesbian, single women 7 and women refused 
treatment due to age restrictions. 8 When self-insemination occurs, the social 
parent(s) of the child will usually know the donor's identity and can decide whether or 
not to provide the Dl child with information about the donation and/or donor. 
Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence available on how frequently these DIY 
inseminations take place, but the case of Re T (Paternity:Ordering Blood Tests/ 
demonstrates that infertile couples in the UK may resort to these methods. Such 
practices raise a whole gamut of difficult legal and ethical issues; for example, where 
the insemination does not take place in a licensed centre, the donor is deemed to be 
the legal father of the resulting child with all of the attendant legal, financial and 
familial responsibilities attributed to such a status. 10 Unfortunately, the legislature 
chooses not to intervene in these situations, 11 leaving the donor offspring at the mercy 
of the adults who have engineered their creation, possibly with their own interests, not 
those of the donor offspring, foremost in mind. 12 
Paradoxically, "D.l.Y. donor offspring" may find in future that their rights to an 
identity receive significantly greater protection than the rights of Dl children legally 
conceived under HFEA regulation. Judicial dicta in three recent cases involving 
orders for blood tests to determine paternity has shown that the courts now seem 
7 HFEA, s 13(5) -this provision has led many clinics to refuse treatment to lesbians and single women 
on the grounds that any resulting child would be fatherless- see G. Douglas & N.Y. Lowe, Becoming a 
Parent in English Law (1992) 108 LQR 414, p419 and G. Douglas, Assisted Reproduction and the 
Welfare of the Child CLP (1993) 53, p 63 - although the COP advises treatment centres not to 
discriminate against any particular group of women, HFE Authority, Annual Report, ( 1992), p20. 
8 SeeR v Sheffield Health Authority ex parte Seale (1994) 25 BMLR I in relation to age restrictions in 
IVF treatment. 
9 [200 I] 2 FLR 1190 (an infertile married couple agreed that the wife would have sexual intercourse 
with a third party in order to become pregnant). 
10 
cf HFEA, s 28( 6)(a)- the donor of sperm used in accordance with the HFEA is not the legal father. 
11 For instance, by not providing criminal sanctions against the use of AID outside the scope of the 
HFEA 1990; see further the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) s 7. 
12 As the COP states, "the welfare of [the] children [cannot} always adequately be protected by 
concern for the interests of the adults involved, " COP, Ch I, pI. 
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willing to uphold the rights of children in general to know the truth about their genetic 
background. Re H (Paternity:Blood Tests), 13 concerning a direction for blood tests in 
a paternity dispute that arose following an extra-marital affair, established that, "every 
child has a right to know the truth unless his welfare clear~v justifies the cover-up, "14 
with explicit reference being made to the child's rights under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 15 This maxim was followed in Re Hand A 
(Paternity:Blood Tests), 16 a similar paternity dispute case arising from an extra-
marital affair, wherein it was held that, "the interests of justice are best served by the 
. ,{' h h ,17 ascertamment o1 t e trut . 
The third case can be said to be even more analogous to the situation of "D.I.Y. 
donor offspring", in that it concerned a married couple who were unable to conceive 
naturally and therefore agreed that the woman would have sexual intercourse with a 
third party in order to become pregnant. The decision in Re T (Paternity:Ordering 
Blood Tests/ 8 found that in general it was in the best interests of the child to know the 
truth about their paternity, although this needed to be balanced against the rights of 
the other parties involved, e.g. their right to respect for their private and family lives 
under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The decisions in these 
cases are to be welcomed, for they demonstrate the courts' commitment to 
recognising the identity rights of children, but it is disappointing to note that only 
"D.I.Y. donor offspring" might benefit from the principles evinced in these cases, 
specifically because their predicaments are not covered by the HFEA 1990. 
13 [1996] 2 FLR 65, per Ward LJ. 
14 Ibid, p80. 
15 Supra, fn 13, p80- Atiicle 7 UNCRC- "a child has, as far as possible, the right to know and be 
cared for by his or her parents. " 
16 [2002] I FLR 1145. 
17 Ibid, pll53. FollowingS v S; Wv Official Solicitor [1972] AC 24. 
18 Supra, fn 9. 
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Where donor gametes and embryos are used in accordance with the HFEA 1990, 
the rights of the social parent(s) 19 and the anonymity of the donor are almost always 
guaranteed. There is a statutory obligation upon the HFE Authority to keep a 
Register of Information relating to the users of their services, including information 
about the patients/social parents, the donors/genetic parents and any resulting DI 
children.20 However, access to the information contained therein is strictly limited to 
the members and employees of the HFE Authority and staff at the licensed treatment 
centres.21 Any unauthorised disclosure of the information contained on the Register 
is a criminal offence, attracting a fine and a maximum penalty of two years' 
imprisonment22 - such is the perceived importance of protecting the confidentiality 
and anonymity of those involved. Consequently, the donor, the recipients of the 
treatment and the resulting donor offspring cannot be identified or identify anybody 
else in the AID process. 
Despite this, within the Act there are certain mechanisms for a DI child to find out 
some information about their conception,23 although there is nothing that allows the 
disclosure of identifj;ing information to the donor offspring.24 Currently, upon 
reaching the age of 18, a child can apply to the Authority to discover whether or not 
his/her name is on the Register. 25 The HFE Authority has: 
19 See Re CH (Contact: Parentage) [ 1996] 1 FLR 560 and Re B (Parentage) [ 1996] 2 FLR 15, 
regarding the effects of the H FEA 1990. 
20 HFEA, s 31 (1) and (2). 
21 Ibid, s 33. 
22 Ibid, s 41(1). 
23 See further Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Disclosure of Information) Act 1992. 
24 COP, para 10.7(c). 
25 HFEA, s 31 (3)(a). 
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"a legal duty to tell adults, who ask, whether they were born as a result of 
treatment using donated eggs or sperm. They must be given a suitable opportunity to 
receive proper counselling about the implications of this information. "26 
However, this provision is of very limited value, given that its usage depends upon 
the child having prior knowledge, or at least a suspicion, that their name may be 
included on the Register. This knowledge, or lack thereof, is of course dependent 
upon how much information the DI child's social parents will have already passed on 
and, as the evidence tends to show, there is a significant degree of reluctance on the 
part of the child's social parents to disclose this fact. 27 The Code of Practice, para 
3.14, currently advises that prospective parents merely be aware of, "a child's 
potential need to know about his or her origins, "28 prior to treatment by AID - a 
relatively weak statement, demonstrating little recognition of the actual needs of the 
DI child. 
Donor offspring aged 16 and over can approach the HFE Authority to inquire as to 
whether or not they might be related to someone that they intend to marry. 29 Again, 
this provision may be under-utilised, given the likelihood that they may not even 
suspect anything about their true status or have any knowledge of the existence of this 
provision. This section seems to be of much greater value to the Authority itself, in 
26 HFEA Leaflet, "Sperm and Egg Donors and the Law" (December 1992). 
27 Two studies found that over 70% of couples questioned had not revealed this fact to their children -
see G. Kovacs, D. Mushin, H. Kane & H.W.G. Baker, A controlled study of the psychosocial 
development ofchildren conceived following insemination with donor semen (1992) 8 HR 778; see also 
S.C.Lui, S.C. Weaver, J. Robinson, M. Debano, M. Neiland, S.R. Killick & D.M. Hay, A survey of 
semen donor attitudes (1994) 9 HR 459. Others have estimated that less than 5% of parents actually 
tell their children the truth - see M. Rayner, The Child's Right to an Identity Rights Now, Dec 1998, 
p20. 
28 Other issues to be considered include the, "attitudes of other family members towards the child; 
implicationsfor the child's welfare if the donor is known to the family; and any possible dispute over 
the identity of the child's legal father"- COP, paras 3.14- 3.17. 
29 HFEA, s 31 ( 4 )(b) and 6. However, there is no protection from the possible consequences of 
consanguinity for unmarried couples who conceive together. 
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attempting to limit its liability for the potential legal, moral and medical dilemmas, 
should two AID offspring, who are genetically related, attempt to marry and start their 
own families. 30 
Finally, if a Dl child was to be born with an inherited disease or disability and the 
screening of the donated genetic material had previously failed to detect any genetic 
defects, which the donor either knew about and had failed to disclose, or something 
which he/she ought reasonably to have known about, the donor could be sued for 
damages under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976.31 Any child 
suffering physical damage as a result of the donor's failure to disclose would be 
allowed a copy of their original birth certificate upon reaching the age of 18, in order 
to bring negligence proceedings against the donor and/or clinic. 32 However, in an 
attempt not to deter potential donors, the Authority has stated that, "legal action is 
extreme~v unlikely provided a donor is open and honest about his or her medical or 
fi ., h • n33 amr y rstory. 
It has been suggested that this last provision could raise issues of equity for all DI 
children, given that in these extenuating circumstances some children would be 
allowed to find out the identity of their genetic parents and others would not. In 
reality this is unlikely to be the case, firstly, because the provision will be infrequently 
invoked and secondly, because the donor's name is not currently included on an AID 
child's birth certificate. Indeed, one wonders about the real reason for the inclusion 
of this provision in the Act, considering the statute's rigorous preservation of the 
concept of donor anonymity in all other circumstances. Perhaps, as some 
3° Counselling is to be offered to people seeking this information: HFEA 1990, ss 31 (3) and (6). 
31 HFEA, s 35. 
32 Parental Orders (Human Fertilisation and Embryology) Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/27670, amending 
the Adoption Act 1976, s 50. 
33 Op cit, fn 26. 
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commentators have astutely pointed out,34 this exception to the principle of anonymity 
exists because, if there were no one to pursue for negligence, the state would have to 
commit considerable resources to support the disabled child. Certainly, this 
provision represents an isolated example in the HFEA 1990 of the state's explicit 
acknowledgement of the presence and importance of a genetic link - could this 
approach not be extended therefore to disclosure of identifying and non-identifying 
information, justified by reference to a donor offspring's identity rights? 
2 The A.I.D. Child 
2.1 The rights of the A.I.D. child? 
As we have already seen, the rights of the AID child are extremely limited. 
Currently, the law in this area states that a person who has reached the age of 18 can 
apply to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Register35 to find out if 
they were conceived by means of donated gametes or embryos.36 Furthermore, at the 
age of 18, the applicant could have the opportunity of receiving certain non-
identifying information, such as ethnic background, medical history, physical 
attributes, etc. about the donor/genetic parent, although no Regulations regarding the 
provision of this infonnation have as yet been made. Fortunately, such Regulations 
to provide non-identifYing information could be made to operate retrospectively,37 and 
34 M. Roberts, Children by Donation: Do they have a claim to their genetic parentage? In 1. 
Bridgeman & D. Monk (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Child Law, London: Cavendish, 2000,47, p53. 
35 See HFEA s 31(1) and (2). 
36 Ibid, s 31 (3)(a). 
37 HFEA, s 31. 
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there seem to be significant justifications and little opposition38 to the proposition of 
certain Regulations being enacted in any future legislative measures.39 
However, despite the fact that the HFE Authority is under a statutory duty to keep 
a Register of information from licensed centres, including identifying information 
about gamete/embryo donors and their resulting offspring,40 this inforn1ation cannot 
be disclosed, except to certain specified people. 41 Furthermore, the retention of such 
information is often alleged to be justified on medical grounds, rather than for the 
purpose of providing genealogical information to Dl children; for example, medical 
supervisors need to have access to the identity of the donor to assess the suitability of 
the specimen and to know the identity of both donor and donor offspring for the 
purposes of assessing the risks of any future congenital defects. 
Furthermore, the Act provides that any future Regulations to provide identifying 
information cannot be made to operate retrospectively,42 a point on which the 
government appears to be firmly resolute, according to the recent Consultation Paper. 
Arguably, it would be possible for primary legislation to be passed to provide for 
retrospective disclosure of a donor's identity, as has already happened with adoption 
legislation,43 particularly given the fact that this information is already contained on 
the HFE Authority's database.44 Despite the government's apparent resistance to 
retrospective disclosure of identifying information, within the following paper, the 
38 Although an amendment was made to the HFEA 1990 during the report stage in the House of 
Commons preventing disclosure of non-identifying information - see further D. Morgan & R. Lee, 
Blackstone's Guide to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, London: Blackstone Press 
Ltd, 1991, p163. 
39 Even Baroness Warnock, chairman of the 1984 Warnock Committee, has recently acknowledged that 
donor anonymity should not be allowed to continue because, "[W]e are so much more sensitive now to 
the idea of genetic inheritance, "The Guardian, Tuesday 14 May 2002. 
40 Section 31(1) and (2). See HFE Authority, The Role of the HFEA, (December 1992). 
41 HFEA, s 33. 
41 Ibid, s 31 (5). 
43 Children Act 1975. 
44 Sec M. Roberts, A right to know for children by donation- any assistance from down under? CFLQ 
(2000) 371, p374. 
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emphasis shall actually be on recognising the importance of providing identifying and 
non-identifying information to DI children, both prospectively and retrospectively. 
Currently, the law in this country does not even provide for a right of access of 
adult donor offspring to information about their genetic parentage. Clearly, there is 
no such corresponding right for donor offspring as children. However, this paper 
argues that there should be a right of access to this information for donor offspring 
before they reach the age of majority, i.e. whilst they are still children. Chapter 2 has 
already demonstrated that it is theoretically possible to ascribe basic human rights to 
children per se. We shall now go on to consider the arguments for and against 
granting actual and effective identity rights to DI children, bearing in mind that their 
rights and interests must be balanced against the rights of the social and genetic 
parent(s) to privacy, confidentiality and respect for their family lives.45 
To recapture, at present, in almost all cases of AID the anonymity of the donor is 
guaranteed and the confidentiality of the social parents is stringently protected at the 
expense of the donor offspring's right to any information regarding their genetic 
background. In general, the mutually reinforcing concepts of secrecy and anonymity 
can be said to have taken tight hold of the existing legal regulation governing donor 
insemination. What is needed now is an extensive re-evaluation, both at a theoretical 
and practical level, to allow for the principle of openness to be wholeheartedly 
adopted within the sphere of AID.46 The government has the opportunity to do this if 
it uses the Consultation period wisely47 and accepts that there needs to be a complete 
overhaul of current legislation - one that recognises the inadequacy of the HFEA 
45 Article 8, ECHR. 
46 See the I-IFE Authority's response to the government's Consultation Paper, s 15. 
47 Department of Health, Donor Information Consultation: Providing information about gamete or 
embryo donors, London: I-IMSO, 2001. 
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1990 in protecting the DI child and also acknowledges that the "rights" - not the 
"welfare" - of the child need to be the primary concern. 
2.2 The welfare of the A.I.D child? 
Current legal regulation has been shown to be woefully inadequate in protecting 
the rights and interests of the 01 child, arguably the person in need of the greatest 
protection.48 The HFEA 1990 seems to focus more on issues surrounding embryo 
research, than it does on the needs of the donor offspring. This is surprising given 
the child-orientated climate in which the HFEA was born, most notably the provisions 
contained in the Children Act 198949 and the implementation of the UNCRC 1989.50 
Indeed, under the HFEA 1990, the degree of concern that should be placed on the 
donor offspring's welfare is extremely ambiguous. Initially there was no explicit 
reference to the child's welfare in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. A 
clause was inserted quite late on during the reading of the Bill, and this only because 
of pressure from the political, moral right to ensure that access to treatment services 
would be restricted to prevent lesbian and single women making use of them. 51 
Under section 13(5), HFEA: 
48 For a fuller discussion of the implications of section 13 (5) HFEA, see op cit, Douglas, fn 7. 
49 Described by the then Lord Chancellor as, "the most comprehensive and far-reaching reform ofchild 
law which has come before Parliament in living memmy, "-Hansard (HL) Vol 502, col488. 
50 Now acknowledged as the most authoritative statement of children's fundamental (though not 
necessarily legal) rights. The UK ratified the UNCRC 1989 on 16 Dec 1991, but it does not fonn a 
substantive part of English domestic law - see G. van Bueren, The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: The Necessity of fnco1poration into United Kingdom Law [ 1992] FL 3 73; although 
the philosophy and principles of the Convention can be significant in the English courts, supra, fn 13, 
p80. 
'
1 An early amendment to the Bill would have made it a criminal offence to provide treatment for 
unmarried women; this was eventually defeated but only by one vote- HL Debs Vol 515, 61h Feb 1990, 
col 787. 
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"A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been 
taken of the we(fare of any child who may be born of the treatment (including the 
need of that child for a fatheri 2 and of any other child ·who may be affected by the 
birth" (emphasis added). 
Arguably, under the HFEA 1990, the "welfare" of the child is not accorded a 
particularly high status. This apparent relegation of the child's welfare stands in 
stark contrast to the emphasis placed on the welfare concept within other child-
orientated legislation. For example, section 1 of the Children Act 1989 provides that 
the child's welfare should be the "paramount consideration," as does section 1 of the 
more recent Adoption and Children Act 2002. It is hereby alleged that the actual 
welfare of the AID child was not really at issue in the HFEA 1990. The Warnock 
Committee had already articulated fears about autonomous motherhood in their 
Report53 and wanted to ensure that treatment services would only be available to 
women together with a partner. It stated: 
"To judge by the evidence many people believe that the interests of the child 
dictate that it should be born into a . ... .loving, stable, heterosexual relationship. "54 
Over the past decade, it has become increasingly obvious that section 13(5) and the 
Code of Practice do not provide sufficient safeguards to protect the interests of the D I 
child. As long ago as 1993, Gillian Douglas articulated significant concerns that 
52 An amendment introduced at the Report stage by David Wilshire MP- HL Debs Vol 174, 21 51 June 
1990, col 1021. 
53 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embtyology (The Warnock Rcport),Cmnd 9414, London: HMSO, 1984, paras 2.9 -
2.11. 
54 Ibid, p 11. 
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section 13(5) was not working as it should and required a substantial overhaul.55 
Douglas' article identified several concerns, which shall be referred to here to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the current provisions. 
Firstly, it has become clear that the true purpose of section 13(5) is as a 
smokescreen behind which value judgements can be made about who should be 
allowed access to treatment services. 56 This allows social judgements to be made by 
the medical professionals57 - people who may not necessarily be qualified to judge 
who is fit to be a parent or assess all of the emotional and psychological needs of the 
future child, including their desire to know about their genetic background. 58 This 
situation can be contrasted with the adoption process, whereby prospective adopters 
must satisfy an adoption panel, which will include non-medical professionals such as 
social workers, of their suitability. It has been said that there are significant 
differences between AID and the adoption process, however, it is argued here that 
they are both concerned with family formation - the fact that one is about finding 
parents for children and the other deals with creating children for parents should not 
interfere with welfare considerations. 
Admittedly, guidance on the welfare of the child is currently provided in the Code 
of Practice, which includes a list of factors to be taken into account when assessing 
the welfare of the child. Most importantly, where donated gametes are used, the 
Code states that clinics and patients should consider, "a child's potential need to 
know about their origins and whether or not the prospective parents are prepared.for 
55 Op cit. Douglas, th 7. 
56 See J. Bridgeman & S. Millns, Feminist Perspectives in Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998, 
pp 131-145, for a discussion of access to treatment. 
57 Douglas draws attention to the fact that the HFEA was the first (and possibly only) statute to 
consider the fitness of prospective parents to have a child of their own. 
58 Douglas carried out empirical research into the actual experiences of fertility patients in licensed 
treatment centres- op cit, fu 7, p61. Her findings showed that, in practice, few attempts were made to 
assess the child's welfare being at risk if the patient were treated. 
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the questions which may arise when the child is growing up. "59 This particular COP 
provision suggests that the government has already recognised that there is an issue 
here. 60 
Further criticism on a different basis may be levelled at section 13(5); in the words 
of the Warnock Committee, who:-
" .... . believed that as a general rule, it is better for children to be born into a 
two-parent family, with both a father and a mother . .... "61 
The history and philosophy behind section 13(5) has demonstrated that the medical 
professionals, the lawyers and the politicians all honed in on the concern that AID 
creates families that differ from the normal, traditional, heterosexual family. Despite 
the proposition that AID can be viewed as being supportive of families' interests, 62 in 
that it is an alternative option for family formation, section 13(5) was adopted in a 
blatant attempt to prevent the sanctioning of too much societal divergence from the 
normal family structure. 63 This in turn prevents acceptance of the proposition that 
the "new family" can be formed in a variety of ways and that it would be quite 
possible to take account of the presence of both social and genetic parents within the 
59 Ibid, paras 3.14- the basis for this recommendation however is not discussed. 
60 Despite the arguments of some that the 01 child's welfare might best be served by not granting them 
the right to any information, because disclosure of the truth might actually harm their emotional and 
psychological development. See K. O'Donovan, What shall we tell the Children? in R. Lee & D. 
Morgan, Birthrights, Law and Ethics at the Beginnings of Life, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1989, pI 04, for examples of it being stressful for some adoptees who decide to meet their genetic 
parents. 
61 Op cit, fn 53. 
62 See further S. Millns, Social Judgements that Go Beyond the Purely Medical: The Reproductive 
Revolution and Access to Fertility Treatment Services in J. Bridgeman & S. Millns (eds), Law and the 
Body Politics: Legislating the Female Body, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 1995, p82. 
63 Admittedly, a concern has been expressed that, "AID becomes a means of dispensing with marriage 
and the inconvenience of a husband and, of course. with a father too" - R. Snowden & G. Mitchell, 
The Artificial Fami(v: A consideration of artificial insemination by donor, London: Unwin, 1981, cited 
in K. Arnup, Finding Fathers: Artificial Insemination, Lesbians and the Law (1994) 7 Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law 97, 114. 
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family structure. Indeed, the provisions of the HFEA seem inherently contradictory: 
on the one hand, sections 27 and 28 render the genetic link between parent and child 
almost irrelevant, whilst section 13( 5) strives to maintain the apparent validity of the 
naturally created genetic family. This theoretical conflict does little to clarify the 
position of any member ofthe Dl family, something that needs to be borne in mind in 
any future regulation. The government would do well to take time to consider the 
views espoused by Bainham,64 regarding Joseph Raz's theory on "value pluralism"-
that, "there are many different and incompatible ways of l(fe. "65 Specifically, 
Bainham suggests that in the context of family relationships, this would mean that, 
"all those intimate and family relationships which can be considered valuable should 
be supported by the state in an even-handed way. "66 Practically speaking, it should 
not be difficult for the government to make this leap and actively support the validity 
of the AID family. 
Therefore, the government needs to seize the opportunity provided by this 
Consultation period, to re-evaluate the proposition that Dl child should have the right 
to be informed of their status and the right to receive both non-identifying and 
identifying information about their genetic parent(s). A swift legislative response to 
the current situation is necessary and this paper suggests that the government should 
bear in mind firstly, the importance of identity to the AID child; secondly, the 
importance of recognising the right to an identity and thirdly, the theoretical and 
practical ways in which their welfare could be better protected, by following the 
proposals for change suggested in chapter 1 of this paper. 67 
64 See A. Bainham, Family Rights in the Next Millenium (2000) CLP 471. 
fiS J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, eh 14. 
66 Op cit, Bainham, fn 64, p 475. 
67 Chapter I, pp4-6. 
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3 'Ihe Importance of Identity 
3.1 Social identity 
The provision of information relating to a person's genetic background is often 
. 'fi d d 68 JUStl te on two groun s. Firstly, for medical reasons, i.e. in terms of the 
prevention and cure of hereditary illnesses and genetic conditions, there is a growing 
recognition that genetic origin information is vital for the health of the Dl child. 
Simpson points out that: 
" .... . any child born as a result of donor assisted conception who is denied 
knowledge of their family history could justifiably be said to be at a medical 
disadvantage compared to any child brought up by their biological parents. 69 
This argument is extremely persuasive, particularly if we consider that the 
information relating to a donor's medical history is important, not just at the point of 
donation, but on an ongoing basis throughout the lives of both donor and donor 
offspring, therefore justifying continual reciprocity between the two parties to update 
the information pertaining to them. This justification for disclosure of information on 
medical grounds is difficult to argue with. However, some might say that such 
medical information could be provided, possibly via an intermediary such as the HFE 
Authority, on the basis of a register linking only the medical information relating to 
the donor and the child. Critics of the concept of disclosure of full identifying 
information might thereby argue that it need not be provided purely on the medical 
grounds suggested above. 
68 HFE Authority Response to the 2001 Consultation, ss 14-15. 
69 S. Simpson, Truth and the Child: a genetic perspective in E. Blyth. M. Crawshaw & J. Speirs (eds), 
Truth and the Child 10 Years On: Information exchange in donor assisted conception, Birmingham: 
British Association of Social Workers, 1998. 
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We need therefore to conclusively demonstrate that disclosure can be justified by 
reference to notions of identity. Arguably, there is a substantial legal basis for donor 
offspring under the age of majority to be afforded a right of access to information, 
based on the provisions of the UNCRC 1989, whereby every child has, "as far as 
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents, "70 and the right, 
"to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as 
recognised by lmv without unlawjit! inte1jerence. "71 However, as shall be discussed 
later in this paper, despite the fact that such a right may be granted to the donor 
offspring whilst they are still children, this may need to be qualified by reference to a 
benchmark of "maturity" 72 and further qualified by reference to Article 5 of the 
UNCRC which provides for, ''appropriate guidance and direction" to be provided by 
a child's parents in the exercise of their rights. 
It is almost impossible to deny that identity is of fundamental importance to the 
individual. On a theoretical level, evidence shows that the notion of identity is 
considered a vital part of an individual's personality and their sense of self. 73 On an 
emotional level, those DI children who are aware of their situation have spoken out 
about their feelings of "shock" and "loss" and "grief" at not having a complete sense 
of their own genealogical identity. 74 Identity helps to define not only how these 
individuals view themselves, but also how others view them as members of society. 
An individual's identity is an acknowledgement of that person's existence, 
70 Article 7( I). 
71 Article 8( I). 
72 As included in the Swedish Act on Artificial Insemination 1985. This standard is assessed by the 
child/adolescent's general practitioner and counsellors, a practice that could easily be adopted in the 
UK. 
73 For personal accounts of donor offspring and their desire for genealogical information see C. Whipp, 
Offspring's perspectives on secrecy in contraception and B. Lauren, Issues for donor inseminated 
offspring, both in op cit, Blyth, Crawshaw & Speirs (eds), fn 69. 
74 See A.J. Turner & A. Coyle, What does it mean to be a donor offspring? The identity experiences of 
adults conceived by donor insemination and the implications of counselling and therapy 15(9) (2002) 
HR 2041. 
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encompassing all aspects of a human being's personality, their birth, childhood and 
adult experiences, beliefs and principles. Admittedly, the concept of identity will be 
viewed differently by every individual,75 however few would deny that one's 
relationships with immediate family members are one of the most important ways in 
which we define ourselves, whether that be at a genetic or a social level. 76 
Because of the secrecy and anonymity that currently pervades this area, the 
evidence relating to the AID child is limited and often conflicting, therefore needs to 
be assessed very carefully. 77 However, the research that is available seems to suggest 
that overall, openness is in the best interests of DI children, 78 to ensure an honest and 
healthy relationship within the social family. 79 Much of this evidence is based on 
research carried out into adoption, 80 which many commentators would suggest is 
analogous to the experiences of those born by AID and therefore lessons could be 
leamt. 81 Such research has suggested that adopted children have a "psychological 
need"82 to find out about their genetic origins and that they should be provided with 
this information early on in life to be able to place themselves within a social context. 
A recent study conducted by Howe and Feast found that finding out information 
relating to their genetic origins was the primmy reason for adoptees initiating the 
search to find their birth parent(s), and notably, that they were not necessarily 
75 Even article 8 of the UNCRC does not provide a clear definition of "identity". 
76 What must be stressed is the importance placed on both the "social" and "genetic" parent(s), but in 
entirely different ways - the "social" parent being responsible for primary care on a daily basis, the 
"genetic" parent as a component of the donor offspring's identity. 
77 For a summary of a number of relevant studies see E. Blyth, b?lertility and Assisted Conception: 
Practice Issues for Counsellors, Bim1ingham: British Association of Social Workers, 1995, p82. 
78 See further M. Johnson, Payment to gamete donors: position of the Human Fertilisation and 
Emb1yology Authority HR (1997) 1839. 
79 Recent research conducted within the sphere of adoption suggests that it would be much better for a 
policy of openness to be embraced in relation to AID. See fm1her D. Casey & A. Gibberd, Adoption 
and Contact [2001] FL 39. 
80 D. Howe & J. Feast, Adoption, Search and Reunion: The long-term experience ol adopted adults, 
The Children's Society, 2000. 
81 E. Haimes, Secrecy: What can artificial reproduction learn from adoption? IJLF ( 1988) 46, p4 7. 
82 J. Triseliotis, In Search of Origins London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 
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motivated by a desire to form new relationships with their genetic relative(s). 83 This 
demonstrates the importance of information relating to genetic origins, as opposed to 
necessarily having contact with a genetic relative. This point must be stressed here -
that in no way does this paper consider that contact should be an automatic right of 
donor offspring. It is information that is vital and, as Haimes argues, 84 information 
that allows children to get a sense of their past, to achieve continuity in life and to 
have a complete biography with regard to their own identity and sense of self. 
Genealogical information is, "essential to our sense of who we are, what we want to 
be, where we come from, and where we belong in the order of things. "85 
Critics of this proposition might argue that such identity issues are not really 
important to, if even comprehensible by, young children. Alternative research does 
indicate that the "need" to know the identity of their donor might not be as great for 
some AID children as for others. 86 However, this apparent disinclination of some DI 
children should not be used to justify withholding information from those who do 
wish to know. It has also been suggested that neither secrecy nor anonymity causes 
any harm to the Dl child.87 Some commentators have gone as far as to say that: 
"The average AID child who has not been told of the AID will be as certain of its 
origins as any other child. The fact that it is mistaken about ha(f of its genes is [to 
. d'J if . h " 88 my mm o no Importance w atsoever. 
83 Op cit .. Howe & Feast, fn 80. 
84 E. Haimes, "Now I know who I really am" Identity Change and Redefinitions of the Self in Adoption 
in T. Honess & K. Yardley (eds), Selfand Identity, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, p363. 
85 J. Owusu-Bempah & D. Howitt, Socio-genealogical connectedness, attachment theory and childcare 
practice CFSW 1997 (2) 199, p20 1. 
86 L. Saffron, Challenging Conceptions: Planning a fami~v by self-insemination, London: Cassell, 
1994. 
87 F. Shenfield & S. Steele, What are the effects ofanonymity and secrecy on the we(fare of the child in 
gamete donation? ( 1997) 12 HR 392. 
88 D. N. Joyce, paper in AID and After, Birmingham: British Association of Adoption and Fostering, 
1984. 
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However, if a child is deliberately prevented from knowing about their genetic 
origins early on in life, as seems to be the case in the overwhelming majority of DI 
conceptions, 89 but later learns the truth, this could almost certainly lead to feelings of 
confusion, bewilderment and distrust90 of those who may have withheld this 
information from him/her, i.e. the social parents. This point was expressly referred to 
almost twenty years ago in the Warnock Report. 91 The members of the committee of 
inquiry felt that, "secrets would undermine the whole network of family 
relationships, " and that it was, "wrong to deceive children about their origins. "92 
Although, in their wisdom, they still saw fit to propose anonymity for donors, at the 
time considered necessary to protect them from parental and financial liability, to also 
maintain an adequate supply of donors and to prevent possible third party intrusion in 
the newly created DI family. 93 
Triseliotis' extensive research into adoptees' experiences has shown it to be the 
case that deception can cause damage to the adoptee child/adult,94 and one could 
certainly draw an analogy here with the position of Dl children. Surely there is scope 
here for the argument that the earlier a child is aware of their situation the easier it is 
for that child to grow up with such information and learn how to handle their status. 95 
Indeed, one of the factors influencing the change in practices within adoption, leading 
to greater openness and access to birth records,96 was because of a concern for the 
89 70% of AID parents do not tell their children of their genetic origins, M. MacLean & S. MacLean, 
Keeping Secrets in Assisted Reproduction - the tension between donor anonymity and the need of the 
child for information (1996) CFLQ 243. 
90 With specific reference to the comments of Joanna Rose inch I of this paper. 
91 Op cit, fi1 53. 
92 Ibid, p21. 
93 See the comments of P. Braude eta!, Human Fertilisation and Emb1yo Bill goes to the report stage 
(1990) 300 BMJ 1410. 
94 Op cit, Triseliotis, fn 82. 
95 See the comments of Ward LJ in Re H(Paternity: Blood Tests), supra, fu 13, p82. 
96 Adoption Act 1976, s 51. 
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shock caused by discovering the truth later in life, when a person's sense of identity 
was already firmly established. This led to the implementation of the Adoption Act 
1976, allowing adoptees to access their birth records and the Adoption Contact 
Register. 97 However, they are only granted such a right when they reach 18, despite 
the strength of Triseliotis' recommendations that they should have received this right 
as children/adolescents. 98 
Studies of adopted children have led to a wider recognition that a child's 
awareness - the earlier, the better - about his/her genetic background is essential to 
the formation of a positive self-identity. Therefore, within the context of adoption, 
being open about a child's status is generally considered to be in the best interests of 
the child. Why then is this not the case for DI children? 
Disclosure of information to adoptees has often been justified on the basis of a 
notion of identity that recognises the importance of genetic ties, whereas the 
provisiOns of the HFEA 1990 are explicitly aimed at de-legitimating the genetic 
link.99 Within Western culture and legal traditions, a great deal of apparent 
importance is often placed on the blood tie, although it has been frequently argued 
that this is a purely social construct. 100 O'Donovan states that, "the literature on the 
search for origins continually emphasises the blood tie. "101 Consequently, she and 
other feminist commentators have criticised notions of identity based on genetic ties 
because of the implications this has for the concept of biological determinism, which 
they consider to be in opposition to the reform of the social status of women. 102 
O'Donovan draws out the implications of placing such great importance on the 
97 Ibid, s 51 A. [T}o record and make traceable the connection between the en fly in the birth register 
and the entl)' in the adoption register"- op cit, 0 'Donovan, fn 61. 
98 Op cit, Triseliotis, fn 82. 
99 Sections 27 and 28. 
100 Op cit, O'Donovan, fn 61, p116. 
101 Ibid, p104. 
102 Ibid, p 104. 
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genetic link. She argues that granting DI children the right to genealogical 
information would firstly, reinforce a biologically determined view of gender identity; 
secondly, would emphasise the importance of "genetic" parenting at the expense of 
committed "social" parenting 103 and thirdly would reinforce conventional ideas about 
family structure as consisting of two heterosexual adults, often married, both of whom 
are genetically related to their children. 
It must be conceded that these are harsh criticisms against disclosure of 
information within the AID context. However, this does not mean that the 
importance placed on the notion of identity should be wholly rejected, purely on the 
basis that data should not be provided about the donor because it serves to reinforce 
the importance of the genetic link. Denying children such information is surely not 
the way to diminish the importance of the genetic tie. Indeed, it is the concepts of 
secrecy and anonymity which have served to reinforce the importance of the blood tie. 
Why go to such lengths to protect this secret if nobody places any importance on it? 
Furthermore, O'Donovan's argument that the importance placed on the blood tie is a 
social construction may be true, but one could certainly argue that such a notion is no 
more socially constructed than the apparent need of the social parents for secrecy and 
the parallel need of the donor for anonymity. 
Sarah Wilson 104 has suggested a policy of disclosure, informed by the principle 
that the perceived importance of the blood tie is not because of the genetic link per se, 
but the impact this has on the continuing development of the donor offspring's 
103 See further C. Smart, There is of course the distinction dictated by nature: Law and the Problem of 
Paternity in M. Stanworth (ed), Reproductive Technologies, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987, p 130. 
104 S. Wilson, Identity, Genealogy and the Social Family: The Case of Donor Insemination IJLPF II 
(1997) 270. 
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'd . 105 1 entity. She suggests that the way to do this is to understand that the notion of 
identity could often be seen as being described from two different viewpoints - a 
"fixed" and a "narrative" identity. 
By way of a brief explanation, descriptions about the notion of identity are 
sometimes made in terms that focus on a fixed, inherent content to a person's identity. 
For example, when Triseliotis talks of a "p5ychological need"106 for genealogical 
information, this suggests that such information will always be crucial to a person's 
identity, even if that person has been brought up by a social family, with no means of 
being aware of the existence of an alternative genetic parent, let alone who that person 
may be or what they may be like. O'Donovan might therefore question why an 
unknown genetic parent would be important to an AID child who had an existing 
satisfactory relationship with a social parent. Wilson would counter this by 
suggesting that a more helpful analysis may be to look at identity in terms of a fluid, 
constantly evolving response to a person's environment and their social experiences, 
i.e. a "narrative" identity. Identity therefore becomes an ongoing reflection of one's 
life based on new information and new experiences - a "continuously revised 
biographical narrative. "107 Furthermore, a person's identity is greatly influenced by 
his/her interaction and relationships with others, i.e. "[T]he narrative of any one life 
is part of an interlocking set of narratives, "108 and undoubtedly, some of the most 
important interaction experiences when one is a child are with the immediate family. 
105 For example, "[O}ur sense of self is bound up with the story that we tell about ourselves. A life 
where the biological parents are unknown is like a novel with the .first chapter missing, " J. Glover, 
Ethics of the New Reproductive Technologies: The Glover Report to the European Commission, 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1989, p37. 
106 Op cit, Triseliotis, fn 82. 
107 A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, London: Polity 
Press, 1991, p5. 
108 E. Haimes & N. Timms, Adoptions, Identity and Social Policy: The search for distant relatives, 
Aldershot: Gower, 1985, p3. 
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Young children tend to expenence their sense of self in very factual, concrete 
terms; they class the people who take care of them as their family, i.e. their social 
parents. However, as children mature, they begin to define themselves in relation not 
only to their primary carers but also as part of the larger society and taking account of 
1 f . d h" 109 a anger sense o time an 1story. Therefore, part of the relationship with the 
people with whom one grows up with often involves asking them questions about 
' h h ' 1 . 1 h . 110 one s own or t at ot er person s genea og1ca entage. Answering the question, 
"who am I?" thus entails some reference to background or family history 111 and this 
could account for the importance often ascribed to the link with one's genetic 
parent(s). 
Wilson's sociological explication of the notion of identity can certainly encompass 
the rights theories proposed in chapter 2, as can Bennett Woodhouse's theory which is 
detailed below. Both commentators suggest that "identity" can represent something 
entirely different to a child during different stages of their childhood and that this 
should be taken into account when deciding at what age different types of "identity 
rights" come into play. Bennett Woodhouse further elaborates on Wilson's concept 
of a "narrative" identity by arguing that a child's identity rights theory has two 
components and that the law should attempt to recognise and respect both of these. 112 
Firstly, there is a child's personal identity, defined as their sense of self in relation 
to those whom they call family, specifically their daily interactions with their primary 
caregivers- their social family. At this stage, the social parents are all-important and 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit would refer to these people as the child's "psychological 
109 See further the comments of B. Bennett Woodhouse, Protecting children's rights of identity across 
frontiers ol culture, political community and time in N. Lowe & G. Douglas, Families Across 
Frontiers, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, p259. 
110 See judicial dicta in the recent case of Gunn-Russo v Nugent Care Society and Secretmy of State for 
Health [200 I] UKHRR 1320. 
111 Op cit, Haimes & Timms, fn I 08. 
112 Op cit, Bennett Woodhouse, fn 109. 
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parents. "113 From a practical point of view, children need a safe and secure family 
environment in order to survive their early years and to begin the process of forming 
any further explicit notion of identity. The right of AID children to be informed of 
their status by their social parents, as explored in chapter 2, could form a component 
of this personal identity, in terms of the fact that, at this age children need to develop 
relationships based on honesty and to know that they are not being lied to or 
deceived. 114 
However, Bennett Woodhouse argues that, as children grow into adolescents and 
then adults, they begin to develop a second component to their identity, one that 
begins to have even greater significance as they continue to mature. Bennett 
Woodhouse terms this as the child's identity of origin, encapsulated within their 
interest in developing their own autonomy and exploring their identity as a member of 
the family into which they have been bom. 115 At this stage of their development, 
children also begin to play a pivotal role in constructing their own identities, taking 
part in a constant dialogue with the world around them. 116 The right to information 
about their genetic background could therefore be crucial at this stage in their lives, at 
a time when they are considered mature enough to understand the implications of 
such information, but when they are still young enough to make use of this 
information to fully develop their own identity. 
In the context of a "narrative" identity therefore, the significance of the genetic 
link lies in the alleviation of uncertainty about the past, created by a lack of 
113 J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, London: Bumett Books, 
1973. 
114 
"[H]onesty is the best policy," per Ward LJ in Re 1-I(Paternity:Biood Test), supra, fn 13. 
115 This "family" could be deemed to include extended family members and even genetic parent(s). 
116 See J. Masson & C. Hanison, Identity: Mapping the Frontiers in op cit, Lowe & Douglas, fu I 09, 
p277. 
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information available to the child. 117 This lack of certainty may be very difficult to 
accept on the part of the child and the need to access information concerning their 
genetic parent(s) could reflect a desire to end that uncertainty, although this desire 
does not, by any means, suggest that the genetic link supersedes or de-legitimates all 
other relationships that the child has, e.g. with their social parents. 118 For example, 
Triseliotis found that 37% of adoptees studied, simply wanted to obtain information 
about their sociological and biological origins. 119 
Research carried out by Haimes and Timms within adoption circles led them to 
conclude that some of the adoptees, "want[ed] a narrative in order to place 
themselves in a continuum of their past, present and future, which will account for 
and explain the possibilities of their lives which underwent a shift, a disjuncture -
even a displacement- when they were placed for adoption. " 120 Haimes and Timms 
describe this sense of disjuncture in terms of a social difference between them and 
many other people, in that they do not have any information concerning their genetic 
background, whereas the majority of other people do. 121 
Wilson describes people in such a situation as having a desire to reclaim a 
" " . d h 1 d d If llJ mem01y m or er to e p un erstan one se . - It is certainly true that many 
people describe themselves with reference to past events; AID children are denied this 
opportunity and their only recourse is to rely on the accounts of others in constructing 
117 In the case of adoptees this sense of displacement can generally only be alleviated by access to a 
birth certificate, i.e. a ''paper identity" providing an undisputed, accurate record of the past - op cit, 
Haimes & Timms, fn 108, p70. 
118 Studies have shown that adoptees attempting to trace their genetic parent( s) do not themselves 
perceive their desire to obtain information as undermining their loyalty to their adoptive parents and 
often try to protect their social parents by not telling them about their attempts to trace their genetic 
parents. This seems to indicate that adoptees generally perceive their social family as their "real" 
family. Some adoptees have also displayed concerns about not disrupting the families of their genetic 
parents- supra, Triseliotis, fn 82. 
119 Op cit, Triseliotis, fn 82, p 15. 
120 Op cit, Haimes & Timms, fn I 08, p81. 
121 Giddens refers to this being almost a sense of "shame" because they feel their inadequacy in these 
terms. See fUither op cit, Giddens, fn 107, p65. 
122 Memoty here does not refer explicitly to what a person actually remembers and recalls about their 
past, but it is used in a broader, more generalised way to explicate a sense of history and biography. 
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their own "narrative. "123 Wilson's analysis of the concept of a "narrative" identity 
recognises the importance of this type of information; the justification therefore for 
allowing the disclosure of information relating to genetic background is that the denial 
of access to this information represents the loss of the ability to tap into the memory 
of others and interpret their genealogical heritage accordingly. 
Evidence of the recognition of the importance of information at this level is best 
demonstrated by the comments made by the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Commission in relation to the case of Gaskin, the root authority regarding disclosure 
of personal information. In Gaskin v United Kingdom 124 the applicant was taken into 
care when he was six months old, following his mother's death. Graham Gaskin 
petitioned to the European Court to seek access to local authority files which related 
to the period he had spent in care, alleging that the refusal of access to his file was 
contrary to his right for respect for his private and family life under Article 8( 1) and 
contrary to his right to receive information protected by Article 1 0( 1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
One of the applicant's aims was to obtain access to his files to learn more about his 
past and to obtain more accurate information about events that he only partially 
remembered. In the opinion of the Court, because Gaskin had been taken into care at 
such a young age, the files were really the, "only coherent record of his early 
childhood and formative years. "125 Therefore this information was important 
because, "it provided a substitute for the memories and experiences of the parents of 
h h 'ld h . . ,126 t e c t w o IS not m care. 
123 According to Haimes & Timms, many adoptees were dissatisfied with this, mainly because they 
often doubted the accuracy of the information- op cit, Haimes & Timms, fn 108. 
124 Gaskin v United Kingdom (Access to Personal Files) ( 1989) Eur Court HR SerA No. I 0454183, 32 
YB Eur Conv HR 176, 12 EHRR 36. 
125 Ibid, p46. 
126 Op cit, fn 124, p45. 
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Also, according to the European Commission: 
"an individual's entitlement to such information relating to his or her basic 
identity and early life is not only of importance because of its formative implications 
for his or her personality. It is also by virtue of the individual's age and condition at 
the relevant time, information which relates to a period when the individual was 
particularly vulnerable as a young child and in respect of which personal memories 
I . bl d if" ,.r; . ..t27 cannot prove a re za e or a equate source o m1 ormatwn. 
However, the Commission drew a distinction between Gaskin applying as a child 
and applying as an adult, for access to his file, implying that he would not have been 
ascribed such rights if he were still a child. Unfortunately for our purposes, the Court 
did not believe it was necessary to consider this point, as Gaskin had applied after the 
end of his childhood. The Court held that Gaskin did have the right to obtain 
information relating to his time in care, effectively creating a right not to be deprived 
of information regarding one's personal history, that could be used to make sense of 
one's present life. Importantly, their comments relating to the importance of 
information can be interpreted as reflecting the notion of a "narrative" identity with 
regard to how Gaskin had lost the opportunity of acquiring any genealogical 
information relating to his past. However, the narrow scope of the Gaskin judgement 
clarifies that there is no general right of access to information about family ties or 
background, regardless of the individual claimant's circumstances; nor is there a 
general right under the Convention to know who one's parents are. 
127 Gaskin v United Kingdom No.10454/85 Comm Rep, 13.11.87, SerA No. 160, 11 EHRR 402, 89, 
p90. 
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Therefore, it is proposed that the notion of identity should be re-evaluated as being 
something that encompasses all spheres of a person's life, one that recognises that all 
of an individual's interactions, including links with social and genetic parents, have a 
significant part to play in the development of that person's sense of self. As such, 
there is no justification for dismissing the notion of an AID identity right merely 
because it is perceived as a social construction that reinforces notions of biological 
determinism and undermines the creation of new types of family structure. A 
concept of "narrative" identity is compatible with different notions of parenthood 
and therefore would allow equal emphasis to be placed on the roles of the genetic 
parent and the social parent, recognising that each has a very significant part to play in 
the wellbeing of the donor offspring. Genealogical background does form a vital part 
of who a child is and recognition of this does not displace the importance of the social 
family. A number of different people contribute to the creation and upbringing of a 
child and all should be viewed as equally important, therefore the AID child should 
have the right to information about all of the people, who have contributed to their 
creation. 128 
3.2 Legal identity 
In England and Wales, the birth certificate provides a statement of what is 
officially recognised as the core of identity and evidence of such for both the 
individual and for the wider society. No other fom1al documentation pertaining to 
128 See supra, Gunn-Russo v Nugent Care Society, fn 110, for a discussion of confidentiality and the 
disclosure of infonnation relating to third parties. 
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identity is currently available in the United Kingdom. 129 The national system ofbirth 
registration was established by the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1836, replacing 
the local parish registers, primarily in order to allow for more accurate proof of 
succession and knowledge of parentage - the importance of a traceable lineage line 
having long been perceived as vital in English law. 130 The birth certificate includes 
the person's name, gender, date and place of birth, the names, occupations and place 
of birth of each of the parents. Therefore, for people who are brought up without any 
contact with or knowledge of their origins, the birth certificate may be the only and 
most important source of their original identity. 131 
However, where children are born by means of AID, birth certificates are issued in 
the names of the legal parents, i.e. the social not the genetic parents, 132 thereby 
deliberately falsifying the birth register- the only instance where the genetic parent(s) 
are purposefully not recorded accurately. Even where children are adopted, new 
birth certificates are issued but the original is always maintained; 133 therefore, donor 
offspring would appear to be in the anomalous position of being the only group of 
people whose birth records are genetically inaccurate from the start. 134 It has been 
argued that the birth register can never actually be considered an accurate record of 
genetic parentage, because of false information provided by married parents and 
entries that fail to disclose the father's name for a variety of reasons; for example the 
129 Although there have been recent moves in the UK to introduce identity cards- see Identity Cards: 
The Next Steps, Cm 6020, London: HMSO, 2003. 
130 Registration: A Modern Service. Cm 531 ( 1988) para 1.11-12. 
131 The historical interest importance of the original birth certificate as a form of one's true 
identification has always been emphasised in other areas of law- for example, where transsexuals have 
applied to amend their birth certificate, there has been a consistent refusal on the part of the state to do 
so, in order to retain the integrity of the birth certificate as a legal document; Corbett v Corbett (orse 
Ashley) [1971] P 83; Rees v UK [1987] 2 FLR Ill. This insistence on the truth being recorded and 
maintained in this area of law stands in stark contrast to the way in which birth certificates of AID 
children are produced, where deception is wholly condoned by the state. 
132 HFEA, ss 27 and 28. 
133 Thereby demonstrating the importance of maintaining the integrity of the original birth certificate, 
even in areas of law where that birth certificate may legally be altered. 
134 Where children are adopted, new birth certificates are issued, but the originals are always 
maintained. 
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mother not knowing whom the father is; not wanting to acknowledge him as the father 
for fear of adverse consequences or the child may be the product of a rape. 135 
However, arguably this is merely a failure of the state to investigate the accuracy of 
each genetic record, rather than a deliberate attempt to deceive. Within AID, it is the 
state itself, which, not only allows, but also actually proscribes, the current birth 
registration system, thus colluding in the falsification of records and allowing for the 
deception of this group of people. Their interest is in the maintenance of social 
stability as regards apparent legal lineage and the need for data for government 
agencies, 136 rather than information for people exploring their family history. 137 
Admittedly, the information provided at birth registration provides a limited basis 
for the development of an individual's psychological identity, but for most people the 
recognition and preservation of the family relations contained therein is a huge 
component of their identity. AID children are denied even this basic information. In 
this respect, the law as a regulatory institution is heavily implicated in altering an 
individual's real or potential identity and in impeding and/or assisting the reclaiming 
of an identity. As such, the government must acknowledge its impact on the 
development of a person's identity in this way and take responsibility for the 
implications that deliberate deception as to genetic parentage has on the AID child. 
Deliberate falsification of the birth certificate could contravene both domestic and 
international human rights laws, given the importance placed on the accuracy of the 
birth record within both of these spheres. One suggestion to counter this alleged 
breach would be to atmotate the birth certificates of all donor offspring so that, upon 
135 M. Freeman, The unscrambling of egg donation in S. MacLean (ed), Law Reform and Human 
Reproduction. Aldershot:Dartmouth, 1992, p280. Statistics range from 5% to 50% of conceptions as 
being recorded inaccurately with regard to the father- see the study of the West I sleworth Area cited in 
B. Hoggett, D. Pearl, E. Cooke & P. Bates, The Fami()'. Law and Society, London: Butterworths, 2002. 
136 Op cit, fn 130, para 5.2. 
137 Other statistical data is also recorded on the birth certificate - Population (Statistics) Acts 1938, 
1960. 
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examination, it would be clear to them that they had been born "by donation". This 
proposal will be discussed further later on in this paper. 
4 The A.I.D. Child's Identity Rights? 
Having now acknowledged that the concept of identity is both socially and legally 
fundamental to all children, we must now examine how the right to an identity for 
AID children could be formulated under existing domestic law. We have already 
made reference to the case of Rose in chapter 1138 - this case was heard in the High 
Court in 2002 and was undertaken as a matter of judicial review of the Secretary of 
State for the Department of Health and the HFEA 's refusals to allow access to 
significant information for donor offspring. The case was conducted by Liberty on 
behalf of two specific claimants and on behalf of all 01 children who would have an 
interest in access to this type of information. 
The first claimant Joanna Rose was born as a result of AID in 1972, at a time when 
secrecy prevailed and treatment services were not licensed under the HFEA 1990. 
The second claimant EM (represented by her mother as litigation friend) was born as 
a result of AID in 1996 post-HFEA 1990; information about her donor was available 
but very limited. The proceedings were brought in an attempt to access non-
identifying information in relation to the donors (possibly also identifying 
information); to request that Regulations be made, concerning the provision of 
information to AID children and the establishment of a voluntary contact register for 
donor offspring and donors. 139 
138 R (Rose & Another) v Secretary of State for Health & Human Fertilisation and Embtyology 
Authority [2002] EWHC (Admin). 
139 Paral5. 
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The claimants sought to rely on Articles 8 and 14, by suggesting that a State Party 
has a positive duty to ensure that certain vital non-identifying information about 
donors is collected and made available to AID children. They alleged that the State's 
consistent failure thus far to take these steps represented a breach of Articles 8 and 14 
and that there was no justification for this failure. Following an application from the 
Department of Health, the High Court only considered whether any of the Articles 
under the ECHR were actually engaged. Mr Justice Scott Baker therefore devoted 
the main body of the judgement to deciding whether or not Article 8 was engaged, 
making specific reference to the root authority- the Gaskin case 140 -and found that 
Article 8 was indeed engaged in this instance: 
"It is to my mind entirely understandable that AID children should wish to know 
about their origins and in particular to learn what they can about their biological 
father or, in the case of egg donation, their biological mother. The extent to which 
this matters will vary from individual to individual. ... . A human being is a human 
being whatever the circumstances of his conception and an AID child is entitled to 
establish a picture of his identity as much as anyone else. "141 
The case has now proceeded to its second stage, to be decided in the near future, 
following the Department of Health's application that any decision should only be 
made in light of the results of the govemment's Consultation exercise on this issue. 
The second stage hearing will consider whether there has been a breach of Article 8 
by the DOH and the HFE Authority; whether or not AID adults and children have 
140 Supra, fn 124. 
141 Para 47. 
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been discriminated against and whether the DOH and HFE Authority are under a duty 
to do more to ensure the protection of the rights of these individuals. 
Perhaps one of the most persuasive arguments for the judges in the Rose case will 
be that the positive rights of AID children should be protected by specific reference to 
their identity rights under intemationallaw 142 - article 7 of the UNCRC states:-
(l) "The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the 
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. " 
Article 8 states:-
(1) "State Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her 
identity including nationality, name and family relations as recognised by law without 
I ,r, I . .t: ,143 un aw1 u znte1:1erence. 
(2) "Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all elements of his or her identity State 
Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing 
speedily his or her identity. " 
Under international law a child is entitled to protection by the State against any 
unlawful interference with their identity and/or any illegal deprivation of it. When 
read in conjunction with one another, Articles 7 and 8 ofthe UNCRC certainly appear 
to point towards a strong emphasis upon the importance attributed to the preservation 
142 The UNCRC 1989 has already int1uenced other domestic family law decisions- supra, fn 13. 
143 Under A11icle 8 a child is identified by reference to their name, nationality and family relations, 
although the Convention does not contain an explicit definition of "identity". 
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of a child's identity and one could argue that the preservation of family relations is 
definitely one component of a person's identity. The issue here is whether or not the 
United Kingdom's current refusal to allow AID children the right to information 
about their genetic origins could constitute an unlawful interference or an illegal 
deprivation of their identity. 
The right of children to preserve their identity was first expressly enshrined in the 
UNCRC as a result of an Argentinian initiative, which had nothing to do with the 
protection of AID children or children in analogous situations. Briefly, the 
background to Article 8 comprises of this: during the drafting of the Convention, 
Argentina's political regime changed from rule by a military Junta to being governed 
by democratically elected representatives. Article 8(1) was proposed by the post-
junta Argentinian delegation specifically as an attempt to prevent a repetition of the 
events that had occurred during Argentina's "dirty war" between 1975 and 1983. 
Evidence had emerged that during this time a number of children had been abducted 
and many others born in secret detention centres and military hospitals, then given to 
childless military and police couples, who had subsequently raised them as their 
own.
144 Argentina wished to create a mechanism whereby this situation could be 
prevented from arising again and also, to place a duty upon states to do their best to 
re-establish the identities of children who had been forced into similar situations, for 
example, child refugees and children involved in internal civil wars. 
Therefore, Article 8(1) UNCRC places a duty on State Parties to undertake to 
respect the right of the child to "preserve his or her identity. " The specified list of 
elements, fundamental to the preservation of identity are non-exhaustive and the 
Convention does not actually define identity. The second paragraph of Article 8 
144 Amnesty International- ''Missing Children" 13/7/87. 
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provides that where children are "illegally deprived" of some or all elements of their 
identity, State Parties will be obliged to provide appropriate assistance and protection 
with a view to re-establishing their identities as quickly as possible. 
Arguably, the Convention's notion of identity could be said to include the AID 
child's right to an identity and therefore support their right to be told o.f their status 
and the right to information. In fact, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
the Child in its Concluding Observations on State Party Reports has recently criticised 
the UK's policies and legislation with regard to this very issue. It stated that, "the 
Commission is concerned that children born out of wedlock, adopted children or 
children born in the context of medically assisted fertilization do not have the right to 
know the identity o.f their biological parents. "145 There could not be a clearer 
statement that current UK law is not in line with international human rights' 
principles. 
Article 7 UNCRC allows for the right of children, "as far as possible to know and 
be cared for" by their parents. Arguably the two concepts of knowing and caring are 
jointly applicable, but they can also be analysed separately. Therefore, the process of 
allowing an AID child access to information about their genetic background would 
clearly relate to "knowing" one's parents. In relation to this, "as far as possible" 
should arguably only apply to the practicalities of the situation not to the legalities, 
i.e. the practical considerations of gathering, recording and retaining the information. 
Does Article 7 refer to the genetic or social parents? Some commentators would 
argue that it could be taken to mean both. The Convention itself does not provide a 
1 ~ 5 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: United Kingdom. 
09/08/2002. U.N Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.l88, para 31. See also the Committee's observations on the 
AID genetic information laws of other, supposedly more liberal, European jurisdictions - Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Norway. 25/04/94. U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.23, para 10 and Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child: 
Denmark. 15/0211995. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.23, para 11. 
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definition of parents and the meaning is therefore open to a certain amount of legal 
and social interpretation. What is clear are the reasons for including Articles 7 and 8 
in the Convention at that time.· 
Hm.vever, academic analysis from Bainham 146 has picked up on some of the more 
oblique points regarding Articles 7, which could be used as further support for the 
protection of the legal status of donor offspring. His arguments suggest that Article 7 
could be used as a basis for asserting a fundamental right to information about one's 
genetic heritage - if we take the word parents to mean genetic parents - and thereby 
give a strong indication of the importance international law places on the genetic 
relationship. Article 7 suggests that the international legal community were 
concerned with a child's status from the moment immediately after their birth, thereby 
suggesting that there was an emphasis on the child's relationship with the birth 
parents. Secondly, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is a 
legal document ratified in 1989, at a time when there was little other domestic 
legislation in any individual countries, regulating what are now perceived to be the 
changes to the traditional notion of parents, brought about by the new reproductive 
technologies. This seems to demonstrate that social and legal attitudes at that time 
were more concerned with genetic parenthood. 
Clearly, there are strong legal arguments to support the view that the identity rights 
of AID children should receive a high degree of protection. However, the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child is unlikely to reach a judicial conclusion in the near future, 
as there is currently no mechanism for individual petitions invoking the UNCRC, 
therefore in order to give practical effect to the arguments concerning the AID child's 
right to an identity, recourse must be had to domestic legal regulation. 
146 A. Bainham, Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive yet Important 
Distinctions in A. Bainham, S. Day Sclater & M. Richards, What is a Parent? A Socio-Legal Ana~ysis, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999. 
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5 The Right to be Told! 
The first step to ensuring an effective right for donor offspring to be told about 
their status is to make this a compulsory part of the DI treatment process - for 
example, the social parents would not be granted fertility treatment unless they 
accepted the need to be completely open with their AID child. This policy would 
reflect the growing trends in adoption practice, 147 although even the law on adoption 
still does not enforce a positive duty on adopters to inform the child of their status. 148 
A second approach would be for amendments to be made to the current birth 
registration system, on the basis that it breaches the DI child's right to be told of their 
status under the ECHR. Arguably, an individual could found a claim under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, alleging that the current system of birth registration breaches 
their right to respect for their private and family life, under Article 8 ECHR, given 
that, "control over knowledge about oneself, "149 is inherent to their right to respect 
for their private life. Article 8( 1) contains a negative obligation on State Parties to 
ensure that, "[E]ve1yone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence, " and therefore protects, "the individual against 
arbitrary interference by the public authorities in [his] private or family life. "150 
Difficulties arise when one tries to assess whether it is private life or family life 
that is hereby engaged, as the birth registration system relates to both of these aspects 
147 Many adoption agencies will not select prospective adopters unless they accept the notion of open 
adoption- see further M. Murch, N. Lowe & M. Burkowski, Supporting Adoption - Reframing the 
Approach, Birmingham: British Association of Adoption & Fostering, 1999, pp80-81. 
148 Although, in 1992 an inter-departmental working group made several suggestions, "to preclude the 
likelihood of any adopted child being deprived ol this information. " This included placing a duty on 
the adoption agencies to make adopters aware of the importance of telling their child that they had been 
adopted (when they were sufficiently mature to understand the nature of this) and also to place a duty 
on the agencies to make reasonable efforts to contact the adoptive parents (when the child was 
approaching the age of 16) to remind them that the child needs to be told the truth - Review of 
Adoption Law, Report to the Ministers of an Interdepartmental Working Group, A Consultation 
Document, Department of Health and Welsh Office (1992) p 52- a proposition that is supported by 
this paper. 
149 A. Freud, Privacy (1968) 77 Yale LJ 475, p483. 
150 Belgian Linguistics Case I EHRR 252, p282. 
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of the individual's life and European case law has shown that it is often difficult and 
unnecessary to compartmentalise the two rights. 151 Prima facie, it might be better to 
found a claim concerning private life, because the judicial dicta in Rose152 has already 
shown that private life and identity, not family life, are the issues at stake in the AID 
context. 153 
The concept of private life is extremely difficult to define precisely, but it has 
traditionally been recognised as relating to notions of physical integrity and to privacy 
relating to one's physical environment. There have been suggestions that identity is a 
part of one's private life, including aspects of one's physical and social identity, 
psychological integrity 154 and the establishment of the details of one's identity as a 
h b . 155 uman emg. Respect for private life should also comprise, to a certain degree, 
the right to establish relationships with other human beings. 156 In Gaskin there was 
explicit recognition that individuals have, ". . .a vital interest, protected by the 
Convention, in receiving the information necessmy to know and understand their 
childhood and early development . .. "157 Given that the alteration of the original 
certificate does not occur in any other instance, including adoptees, then the current 
birth registration system could be viewed as discriminatory 158 and disproportionate to 
I . d 159 t 1e aim pursue . 
At an international legal level a great deal of importance is placed on the 
registration of a child immediately after birth, regardless of their status, and the 
151 X, Y & Z v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 143, para 41. 
152 Supra, fn 138. 
153 Ibid, para 43. 
154 Mikulic v Croatia (2002) App No 53176/99 2002, paras 52-53. 
155 Johnston v ireland (1987) 9 EHRR 303, para 55. 
156 See mutatis mutandis Niemetz v Germany 16 EHRR 97 (judgement of 16 December 1992, Series A 
no. 251-B, p33, para 29). 
157 Gaskin v United Kingdom (1989) 12 EHRR 36, para 49. See also Martin v United Kingdom App 
No. 27533/95. Article 8 has also been relied upon in domestic decisions relating to the disclosure of 
personal information - see further ReX: Disclosure of Information [200 1] 2 FLR 440, p451. 
158 Article 14, ECHR. 
159 See further Price v UK App No. 12402/86 D & R 55, p224 for a discussion of proportionality. 
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preservation of the accuracy of that birth record. 16° Furthermore, the ECHR does not 
expressly place a duty on a State Party to register a child immediately after birth, but 
failure to register could amount to an unlawful interference under Article 8. In 
Kalderas' Gypsies v Federal Republic of Germany and Netherlands, 161 the European 
Commission on Human Rights considered that a failure to issue a birth certificate 
could amount to an interference and in Marclo: v Belgium, 162 the European Court 
ruled that Article 8 of the Convention included the registration a child's birth without 
additional procedural requirements, regardless of the marital or non-marital status of 
the child. 
A breach could only be demonstrated if the interference could not be justified 
under Article 8(2) ECHR. The most pertinent justifications would be, "for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of rights and freedoms of others. " 
For example, the state could argue that by not currently amending the birth certificate, 
it is in the best interests of the AID child because it prevents the child from 
accidentally finding out about the nature of their conception. Given the state's wide 
margin of appreciation 163 with regard to Article 8, it is difficult to say conclusively 
whether or not the current system would constitute a breach. The decision in X Y 
and Z v UK164 demonstrated that there is still a lack of consensus in legal opinion 
concerning AID issues amongst ECHR State Parties and therefore accorded a wide 
margin of appreciation. Certainly, it is assumed that, given the UK government's 
restrictive stance on this issue, they would want to retain a certain amount of 
discretion over this sphere of legal regulation, whatever the future may hold. 
160 Article 7(1), UNCRC. 
161 Application No. 7823 ( 1977) II DR 221. 
162 [1979) 2 EHRR 330. 
163 See Handyside v UK 1 EHRR 737. 
164 Supra, fu 151. 
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For example, despite the fact that, in the UK, an adoptee has the right to apply for 
their birth certificate when they reach the age of 18, the state still retains a discretion 
as to whether or not the information should be made available. In R v Registrar 
General ex parte Smith 165 the Court of Appeal held that the Registrar General may, in 
certain circumstances, refuse to supply information to an adopted child applying for 
their birth certificate as an adult. Indeed, they went so far as to say that it was, 
"beyond belief that Parliament contemplated that an adopted child's right to obtain a 
birth certificate should be absolute. "166 
However, given the arguments evinced above, it seems almost impossible to justify 
why the present system is still in operation. Annotation of the AID child's birth 
certificate to include the words "by donation", etc. would seem the ideal mechanism 
for ensuring that donor offspring have the right to be told about their status: firstly 
because it would have the effect of encouraging the social parents to be open with 
their child from an early age; secondly, it would encourage openness and acceptance 
within the whole AID process and thirdly, it would guarantee that the donor offspring 
would be in a position to take advantage of their right to receive information. 
6 The Right to Receive hnformation 
Prima facie, the denial of access to AID records could have an impact on a child's 
right to respect for their private and family life, under Article 8 ECHR; as 
demonstrated, Article 8 contains a negative obligation on State Parties not to interfere 
with an individual's private and family life. However, the European Court has also 
165 (1990) 2 QB 253- concerning an applicant who had been detained in a top security hospital for two 
murders and who was considered a "potential menace" to his biological mother in the future, should he 
be allowed access to his records. 
166 Ibid, p260. 
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implied that Article 8 may impose positive obligations upon the state to take measures 
to promote that respect, 167 "to act in a manner calculated to allow those ties to 
d I ll nl68 eve op norma y. This could imply that the UK government, through the HFE 
Authority, has a duty to collect, retain and disseminate genetic background 
information to donor offspring. However, even if one could not point to a positive 
obligation, there may be a negative obligation on the state to refrain from interfering 
with the AID child's right to respect for their family life under Article 8. 
Given the nature of the information, it could be said that the right to receive 
information related to the AID child's right to respect for their private life, if we 
accept the above discussion relating to the right to be told. It could also be alleged 
that this right relates to the child's family life. The concept of family life is not, 
however, easy to define and thus far, the European Court and the Commission have 
not provided a clear statement of what is meant by the family. 169 However, it could 
be argued that if the definition of family life varies so greatly 170 then the concept of 
respect for family life should also vary and take on a more dynamic and creative 
definition. 171 Despite this, an analysis of the relevant treaty provisions and 
jurisprudence seems to demonstrate that, according to the Council of Europe, the 
family is rooted in, but not limited by, biological relationships; for example the family 
could include specific social relationships such as existing adoptive relationships 172 
and also foster children. 173 What has also emerged is that when a man donates his 
167 Op cit, fu 162. 
168 Ibid, p348, para 45. 
169 G. Douglas, The Family and the State under the European Convention on Human Rights IJLF 2 
(1988) 101. 
17° Furthennore, "the Convention must be inte1preted in the light ofpresent-day conditions,"- op cit, 
fu 162, p346, para 41. 
171 T. Opsahl, The Convention and the Right to Respect for Family Life in A.H. Robertson, Privacy and 
Human Rights, Manchester: Manchester University Publishing, 1973, p225. 
172 Application No. 9993/82, X v France 31 D & R 1983, 241. 
173 Although, see the submissions of the government and the dissenting opinion of Schermers in 
Erikson v Sweden Series A No. !56 1989 at p56. 
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sperm specifically to enable a woman to become pregnant through AID, this 
biological link does not of itself give the donor or the donor offspring a right to 
respect for their family life with each other. M v Netherlands 174 demonstrated that 
donorship seems to be an unsound basis upon which to formulate the sufficiently 
close link that is necessary in order to protect family life under the ECHR regime. 175 
Further, such an approach seems to be consistent with previous European 
Commission decisions, that "close personal ties "176 are necessary to bring oneself 
within the application of A11icle 8, in addition to parenthood per se. 177 Therefore, it 
would seem that under the European Convention, the genetic link between donor and 
offspring would be insufficient to give rise to an AID child's right to protection of 
their family life. 
However, commentators including Geraldine Van Bueren 178 would argue that, at 
least in relation to adoption, if we restrict the rights of children to information about 
their genetic background, then we may not know of the existence of living family 
members including half-siblings. Arguably, to deny access to such information could 
breach the right to respect for family life in relation to these other family members. 
Van Bueren 179 has also suggested, again in relation to adoption, but something that 
could equally be applied by analogy to AID, that, if procedural requirements 
obstructing registration can amount to a breach of Article 8, 180 it may be arguable, 
adopting a teleological approach, that procedural obstacles at a later stage, i.e. when 
the child wishes to access information, are also a violation of their right to respect for 
174 (1993) 74 DR 120. 
175 G v Netherlands Application No. 16944/90. 
176 R v United Kingdom App No. 10496/83 0 & R 38, 189 at p195. 
177 Application No. 11468/85 at n 12. 
178 G. Van Buercn, Children's Access to Adoption Records - State Discretion or an Enforceable 
International Right? (1995) 58 MLR 37. 
179 Op cit, fn 178. 
180 Supra, fn 161, 162. 
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their private and family life. Despite this there is little evidence to support the 
suggestion that family life would feature in the argument that the AID child should 
have the right information on their genetic background, although following Gaskin 
and Rose, private life would almost certainly be engaged. Whether or not a breach 
can be proven on this basis has yet to be demonstrated in the Rose case. This again 
will require an analysis of the provisions under Article 8(2) as to whether the breach 
can be justified. The provision most likely to be engaged will be, "for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others" - in particular the rights of the social parents 
and the donor, something that we shall now go on to examine in the following 
chapters. 
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4. 1fhe §odal Parellllts 
Almost all children can say with certainty that they know who their mother is and 
the majority of children know who their father is, but this fundamental human right is 
denied to AID children under current UK legal regulation. This chapter shall explore 
if and how the potential rights of the AID child described in chapter 3 might impact 
upon the rights of the social parents, the possible conflict between these parties and 
the ways in which future legal regulation could be specifically aimed at resolving any 
potential conflict to the benefit of all the parties involved. 
1 The Parents of the A.X.D. Child 
Many people would instinctively point to a child's "natural" mother and father as 
his/her parents.' However, paradoxically, it is this terminology and perception of a 
"natural" family form that can be partly blamed for many of the current problems 
within the AID sphere, given that several of the provisions within the HFEA 19902 
are aimed at perpetuating the myth that there is such a thing as a "normal" family. 3 
However, given the nature of AID, donor offspring cannot necessarily point to a 
"natural" mother and father. Admittedly, there may be some instances other than 
1 Although, according to Eekelaar, the concept of parenthood can be broken down into three 
constituents - biological parenthood, legal parenthood and the concept of parental responsibility - all 
three of which may be vested in the same person or in separate individuals - J. Eekelaar, Parenthood. 
Social Engineering and Rights in D. Morgan & G. Douglas (eds), Constituting Families: A Study in 
Governance. Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart, 1994, pp85-89. 
2 In particular sections 13( 5), 27 and 28. 
3 The family in modern society can actually take many different forms. See B. Dickens, Reproductive 
Technology and the "New .. Fami~y in E. Sutherland & A. McCall Smith (eds), Fami~v Rights: Family 
Law and Medical Advance, Edinburgh: Edinbugh University Press, 1990, p28. 
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those involving AID where the identity of a child's genetic parent(s) is in doubt,4 
although this does not on its own justify the retention of the concepts of secrecy and 
anonymity within the AID sphere. 
Artificial reproduction techniques (ART's) were originally developed in order to 
treat infertile couples,5 thereby parent-orientated rather than child-centric in focus. 
According to the HFE Authority, approximately 16% of all married, heterosexual 
couples may be infertile6 and AID is one of the treatments used to remedy infertility. 
Artificial insemination using a woman's husband's or partner's sperm (AIH/AIP),7 as 
opposed to artificial insemination by donation, does not entail any significant 
consequences for the rights of the donor offspring, as there is no separation of genetic 
and social parenthood. 
Technological advances now mean that it is possible for the AID child have up to 
six different "parents" - a genetic mother (egg donation) or mothers (as eggs from 
two women can now be used to create one egg); 8 a gestational mother (in surrogacy 
arrangements) and a social mother, a genetic father and a social father. 9 Overall, 
sections 27 and 28 of the HFEA 1990 have successfully clarified whom we should 
regard, out of all these possibilities, as the legal parents of DI children. 10 However, 
4 A woman may not know who the father of her child is or may attempt to deceive her husband/male 
partner into believing that he is the biological father. 
5 ART's are primarily aimed at the alleviation of infertility not childlessness. 
6 
www.hfea.co.uk/ForPatients. 
7 Some clinicians also advocate the use of AIHD (artificial insemination by husband and donor), 
whereby the infertile couple continue to have sexual intercourse during the course of their treatment, 
leaving open the possibility that any resulting donor offspring may still be genetically related to both 
parents. As one commentator says, "the performance of this medical act is not always conclusive that 
the child was real~v born from a donated gamete·· - J. Haderka, Artificial Reproduction in 
Czechoslovakia Law with special reference to other European Socialist States I IJLF 72, 85 (1984). 
8 See further "Baby created from two mothers raises hope for childless .. The Sunday Times, 14 June 
1998; "Fertility doctors create babies with two mothers .. The Sunday Times, 16 May 1999. 
9 R. Snowden & G.D. Mitchell, The Artificial Family: a consideration of artificial insemination by 
donor, London: Allen & Unwin, 1981. 
10 HFEA 1990, ss 27 and 28 - the gestational mother is the legal mother, whether or not she is also the 
genetic mother and whether or not she intends to be the social mother (s 27). Identifying the legal 
father is more complicated. Section 28(6)(a) ensures that the donor of spenn is not the legal father 
provided the spenn is used in accordance with the other provisions of the HFEA. If the woman being 
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conversely, the provisions of the HFEA have also added further complexity to the 
issue of being a parent under English law -most notably by bringing about a situation 
where a child born following AID treatment services may be left legally fatherless.'' 
However, in general, the legal position of the AID child and their social parents seems 
to be quite clear- the difficulty arises in relation to the balancing of the rights of both 
of these parties. 
Despite the fact that assisted conception techniques were originally envisaged as 
being supportive of the family structure, in that they enabled new relationships to be 
formed in otherwise impossible situations, the relationships that the AID process 
throws up can be viewed as being extremely complex; the "genetic link" is severed 
and a new "social bond" must be established. The members of the newly-created 
"social" family may find it hard to reconcile their individual interests and the law 
needs to step in to ensure that, whilst everyone's needs are met, one party does not 
suffer at the expense of protecting the rights of others. 
With respect to the infertile couple/social parents, their rights and interests might 
include a right to receive fertility treatment; 12 a right to medical confidentiality in 
pursuance of that treatment; 13 a right to found a family; 14 the right to respect for their 
private lives and the right to respect for their family lives. 15 The primary opposing 
interest of the 01 child is in the acknowledgement, by his/her social parents and also 
treated is married, her husband is presumed to be the father (s28(5)(a)). This presumption can be 
rebutted but if he consented to the treatment, he is the legal father (s28(2)). Is a woman is not married 
but receives treatment services provided for her and a man together then her partner is deemed to be the 
father (s28(3)). 
11 Where an unmarried woman is treated but not "treated together" with her male partner then the 
partner is not the legal father and the child is left legally fatherless (s28(3) HFEA 1990)- see the recent 
decisions in Evans v Amicus Healthcare & Others [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam) and Re R (A Child) 
[2003] 2 All ER 131. This may also occur where there is posthumous use of a man's genetic material 
(s28(6)(b) HFEA 1990- see further R v 1-IFEA ex p Blood [ 1997] 2 WLR 806. 
11 See R v Sheffield Health Authority ex parte Seale ( 1994) 25 BMLR I. 
13 Section 33, HFEA 1990. 
14 According to Articles 8 & 12, European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
15 Article 8, ECHR. 
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by the state, that they have a right to be informed about their status, arguably as early 
in life as possible, as a constituent of their right to an identity. 16 
The apparent need for secrecy within the AID sphere has traditionally been seen to 
be the barrier to resolving this balancing of rights. However, the evidence is 
conflicting as to whether or not the prevalence of an aura of secrecy in DI families is 
real or purported. The Donor Conception Network, 17 a UK voluntary organisation 
for DI parents and children, fim1ly states that it actively encourages all of its member 
to embrace openness within the family. Their aims are, "to provide support to 
existing parents, to the children themselves and to those contemplating or undergoing 
treatment," and, "to increase public awareness and acceptance of family creation 
through gamete donation. " 18 In their experience, a significant number of those who 
conceive through AID now actively choose to inform their child of this. However, 
recent academic research has suggested that the contrary is still true. A Swedish 
study 19 found that only around half of all DI parents were complying with Swedish 
law by telling or intending to tell their child about their biological origins, despite 
domestic legislation enacted as long ago as 1985, which provided for a right to 
information. 20 This research tends to suggest that openness is still not the norm and 
that an ethos of secrecy continues to pervade many DI families. 
This is despite the fact that there is a growing body of very persuasive evidence to 
show that secrecy and deception can be extremely harmful to the AID child. Another 
recent study found that keeping secrets can have a very negative effect on the child's 
development, leading to feelings of shock and loss on discovery of the truth, often 
16 Under Articles 7 & 8, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). 
17 See their website at www.dcnetwork.org.uk. 
I g Ibid. 
19 C. Gonlieb, 0. Lalos & F. Lindblad, Disclosure of donor insemination to the child: the impact of 
Swedish legislation on couples (2002) 15 HR 2052. 
20 The Swedish Insemination Act 1985 provides that a Dl child has the right to be told about their true 
identity when they are "sufficiently mature". 
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occurring in adulthood. 21 Many other commentators have acknowledged the damage 
that secrets can have on the DI family22 and espoused the need for openness in these 
I . h' 73 re atlons tps.-
succinctly: 
A Donor Conception Network newsletter makes the point most 
"Big secrets are unhealthy in intimate relationships . .... They are usually caused 
by feelings of shame, and shame about the methods of family creation will inevitably 
colour the parent and child relationship. "24 
Despite some commentators arguing that secrecy does not cause harm to the DI 
child,25 there is evidence to suggest that this could indeed be so. Recognition of the 
impact of secrecy and deception on the lives of the donor offspring and an 
acknowledgement that these children should have the right to be kept informed of 
their status outweighs the rights of the social parents and justifies intervention on the 
part of the government. The difficulty appears to lie in exactly what form such 
measures should take, given the balancing of interests that must be carried out 
between both parties, particularly in light of the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
21 A.J. Turner & A. Coyle, What does it mean to be a donor offspring? The identity experiences of 
adults conceived through donor insemination and the implications for counselling and therapy (2002) 
15 HR 2041. 
22 See E. Haimes, Secrecy: What can Artificial Reproduction Learn fi"om Adoption? ( 1988) 2 IJLPF 46; 
W. Hewitt, Why I told our children in Donor Conception Support Group of Australia Inc., Let the 
Offspring Speak: Discussions on Donor Conception, George's Hall, New South Wales: Donor 
Conception Support Group of Australia, 1997. 
23 Advocated by the HFE Authority itself, at section 58 of its response to the government Consultation 
Paper. See further M. Johnson, Payment to gamete donors: position of the Human Fertilisation and 
Emb1yology Authority HR 12 (1997) 1839; comments of Sir Robert Winston cited inS. Wavell, The 
Sunday Times News Review 6 July 1997, p6. 
24 W. Merricks, ls it ethica/:1 Dl Network Newsletter, II May 1996, p4. 
25 F. Shenfield & S. Steele, What are the eflects ofanonymity and secrecy on the welfare of the child in 
gamete donation? ( 1997) 12 HR 392. 
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2 Why the Secrecy? 
Traditionally, the process of AID has always been shrouded in secrecy.26 Modern 
AID techniques were originally inspired by the desires of infertile couples to become 
parents and to have a "child of their own ".27 The dynamic growth of the fertility 
"industry" coincided with a fall in the number of newborn and young babies given up 
for adoption from the 1960's onwards, following a change in social attitudes towards 
single mothers, a lessening in the stigma attached to illegitimacl8 and an increase in 
the use of contraception. 
AID is primarily a treatment for infertility and, given that almost 1 m 10 couples 
may have difficulties conceiving,29 it undoubtedly has an important role to play. 
Infertility is generally regarded by many clinical professionals as an "illness"30 - the 
infertile couple are the patients and the DI child is seen as a successful "cure".31 
However, not everyone would agree with this approach,32 given that the birth of a DI 
child is not really a cure for the condition of childlessness not infertility, and that 
childlessness may be combated in other ways, for example adoption.33 
Current legal regulation of this area, in the form of the HFEA 1990, seems to be 
heavily concerned with protecting the interests of the social parents as patients, not 
26 AID techniques were also said to have been "practised discretely'' during the nineteenth century -
seeS. Novaes, The medical management ofdonor insemination in K.R. Daniels & E. Haimes, Donor 
Insemination: International Social Science Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998. 
27 C. Overall, Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Ana~}'sis, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987. 
28 Following changes to illegitimacy laws under the Family Law Reform Act 1987. See further M. 
MacLean & M. Richards, Parents and Divorce: Changing Patterns of Public Intervention in A. 
Bainham, S. Day Sclater & M. Richards (eds), What is a Parent? A Socio-Legal Analysis. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
29 Donor Conception Network, www.dcnetwork.org.uk. 
30 This appears to be the case legally as well, given the decision in op cit, R v Sheffield Health 
Authority ex parte Seale, fu 12, concerning age restrictions on access to NHS IVF treatment. S. 
Elliston & A. Britton, Is infertility an illness? R v Sheffield Health Authority ex p Seale NLJ 11 
November 1994, p1194. 
31 Op cit, Overall, fu 27, for a more detailed discussion of the use of the language of disease and cure in 
respect of infertility. 
32 A. McWhinnie, AID and Infertility (1986) 10(1) A&F 16. 
33 Although the general philosophy of adoption is as a means of providing children with parents, not 
parents with children. 
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the donor offspring. The infertile couple appear to be the subject of the Act, with the 
focus being upon their fertility needs. 34 The medicalisation of this area has led to the 
resulting donor offspring being regarded as a "cure", not a newly-created human 
being, and there still remains little explicit recognition in UK clinical and legal 
circles, of the social significance of gamete and embryo donation within the medical 
context. 
This paper does accept that infertility can be an extremely distressing condition -
"a kind of grief, something sent to burden those unable to conceive . ... . a disease just 
l 'k h .. 35 1 e any ot er. This paper also accepts the infertile couple's right to receive 
treatment for their condition and, as a corollary to this, their right to found a family, as 
well as the right to medical confidentiality during that treatment. It seems feasible to 
speak in terms of a right to fertility treatment by means of AID,36 although this may 
not be an absolute right given the limits currently placed on access to treatment. 37 It 
also seems feasible to speak of the infertile couple's right to medical confidentiality 
given the effect of the provisions of the HFEA 1990 relating to the unauthorised 
d. I f · c · 38 tsc osure o In10rmatwn. 
The right to reproduce or procreate may be viewed as being slightly more 
contentious. Previous commentators have discussed the issue as to whether there is a 
34 P. Spallone, Beyond Conception: The New Politics of Reproduction, London: Macmillan, 1989 -
Spallone argues that the subject of the Act is not children and women, but eggs and sperm. 
35 See further S. MacLean & M. MacLean, Keeping secrets in assisted reproduction - the tension 
between donor and anonymity and the need of the child for information 8 CFLQ [1996] 243; D. 
Morgan & R. Lee, Blackstone's Guide to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 
Blackstone Press 1990. 
36 Op cit, fu 12. NHS guidelines issued in August 2003 calling for more free IVF treatment on the 
NHS also point to greater recognition of the right to receive fertility treatment- www.doh.gov.uk. 
37 See the discussion of Gillian Douglas regarding the effects of section 13(5) HFEA 1990 as a barrier 
to the treatment of certain individuals - G. Douglas, Assisted Reproduction and the Welfare of the 
Child CLP (1993) 53. 
38 HFEA, ss 33 and 41. 
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basic human right to reproduce39 and the claim to such a right has often tended to 
attract much sympathy, particularly in high-profile cases.40 However, recent judicial 
dicta has shown that sympathy is not sufficient to claim the right to a baby. 41 Despite 
this some commentators would argue that there is a general right to reproduce, 
although it cannot be said to be an absolute right. 42 . Within modem legal discourse, 
one can also point to the combined effects of Articles 8 and 12 of the ECHR, as a 
substantial legal basis for the right to reproduce and found a family. 43 
However, although we can speak in terms of a basic natural right to reproduce and 
have a child, can we say that this applies to medically assisted reproduction? In this 
instance, what is essentially a private issue becomes a matter of public concern and 
hence the object of legal regulation.44 Also, because AID requires the use of third 
party genetic material, it has led some commentators to suggest that, within the 
confines of AID, we cannot speak of a fundamental human right on the part of the 
infertile couple, to have children using somebody else's genetic material,45 albeit we 
can point to a qualified legal right to marry and found a family. However, there is no 
positive obligation inherent in Article 12 upon a State Party to promote the rights of 
married couples to procreate, for example by the provision of fertility treatment.46 
Furthermore, it seems difficult to allege that the rights of the social parents - to 
39 S. MacLean, The Right to Reproduce in T. Campbell, D. Goldberg, S. MacLean & T. Mullen (eds), 
Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986; E. Kingdom, Birthrights: 
Equal or Special? in R. Lee & D. Morgan (eds), Birthrights: Law and Ethics at the Beginnings of Life, 
London: Routledge, 1989. 
40 Op cit, Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd & Others, fn 17. 
41 Per Hale LJ, U v Centre for Reproductive Medicine [2002] EWCA Civ 565, para 24. 
4
" C. Hegnauer, Human Rights and Artificial Procreation by Donor in J. Eekelaar & P. Sarcevic, 
Parenthood in Modern Society, p207. Historically the process of procreation has been defined and 
restricted by rules laid down in the criminal law and the rules on marriage. 
43 X v Belgium and Netherlands Application 6482/74 D & R 7, p25; X & Y v United Kingdom 
Application 7229/75 D & R 12, p32. 
44 SeeK. O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985, cited in J. 
Bridgeman & S. Millns, Feminist Perspectives on Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998. 
45 Op cit, Hegnauer, fn 42. 
46 K. O'Donnell, Parent-Child Relationships within the European Convention in N. Lowe & G. 
Douglas (eds), Families Across Frontiers, Netherlands,: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. 
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fertility treatment, to confidentiality in that treatment and to have a child- conflict too 
greatly with the right of the AID child to be told oftheir status. Firstly, because these 
rights have little to do with the provision of information later in the 01 child's life and 
secondly, because at the time that the balancing exercise would be carried out, the 
child would not have been born and it would be impossible to discuss their human 
. h b 47 ng ts as em ryos. 
However, it often seems that the rights and interests of the future child are 
overlooked in favour of the more immediate and pressing concerns of the infertile 
couple.48 Whilst it is accepted that the law needs to be sympathetic to the needs of 
the infertile couple, the welfare and the rights of the donor offspring should not suffer 
as a consequence. To quote from the Human Genetics Advisory Committee/Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority on Cloning: 
"The relief of the pain of infertility is, in general, a good end, but it is not an 
absolute end. ... The wish for genetic offspring is a natural human aspiration, but 
this is to be held in balance with other desirable aspects of human well being and it 
cannot be given overriding priority above all other considerations. "49 
The enactment of the HFEA 1990 arguably placed the infertile couple on a very 
firm legal footing; 50 legal regulation of the treatment of infertility is now widely 
accepted and the protection of the interests of the patients as prospective social 
parents is, on the whole, well protected by the HFEA, the HFE Authority and the 
47 In ReF (in wero) [1988] Fam 122; Re MB (medical treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426. 
48 G.J. Annas & A. Milunsky, Genetics and the Law, London: Plenum Press, 1976. 
49 HGA/HFEA, Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science and Medicine, London: Human Genetics 
Advisory Committee (December 1998), para 4.6. 
50 Prior to 1990, regulation of ART's was through the Interim Licensing Authority for Human In Vitro 
Fertilisation and Embryology, a self-regulatory body established by the Medical Research Council and 
the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists in 1985 (previously the Voluntary Licensing 
Authority). 
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Code of Practice, whilst the rights and interests of the donor offspring seem to have 
been subjugated, despite recognition within the Code of Practice that: 
" ... while infertile people deserve and can expect proper consideration of their 
medical and social needs, licensed treatments may result in children who would not 
otherwise have been born, and whose needs must also be taken into account. "51 
Therefore, any enactment of future Regulations, as suggested in the government 
Consultation Paper, needs to take into account the social impact of infertility and 
secrecy within the DI family - primarily because, as acknowledged earlier in this 
paper, it is the DI social parents who hold the key to the future of the DI child. They 
are the ones who can choose to tell their child the truth or not and current statistics 
consistently seem to show that they are still choosing secrecy over openness. 52 
The perceived importance on the maintenance of secrecy in the DI family has 
contributed to the current lack of recognition of the rights of the donor offspring. 
The exact reasons for the importance placed on such secrecy have never been fully 
and explicitly articulated, but it has been assumed to be due in tum partly to the 
traditional legitimacy laws; also because of religious and moral concerns over the 
sanctity of the marital bond between the recipients, which could be disturbed by third 
party intervention; partly, because of the charge that these processes are interfering 
with nature and also, when considering donor insemination, the stigma that is attached 
51 Code of Practice (revised June 1993), ch 4, p2. 
52 Op cit, Gottlieb eta/, fn 19. See also R. Cook, S. Go lombok, A. Bish & C. M unay, Keeping Secrets: 
A study of parental attitudes towards telling about donor insemination, Clinical Health and Research 
Centre, City University, London, 1995. 
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to male infertility. 53 All of these factors seem to have contributed to enormous 
pressure on the social parents to keep the means of the conception a secret. 
For example, not informing donor offspring of their true genetic heritage allows 
the DI family to present itself as a traditional nuclear family and therefore assume a 
mantle of "normality" both for its own sake and for the sake of appearances to the 
outside world. 54 The issue of "normality" appears to be of great importance to the 
social parents; one recent study showed that not one of them had told their child of the 
method of their conception and that most had decided never to do so. 55 An even 
more recent study assessing the actual reasoning behind parental (non) disclosure of 
the truth of the child's conception found that out of 70 men and 86 women who had 
had children by means of donated gametes and/or embryos, 54% said that they would 
not disclose this to their children, for reasons of "confidentiality". However, 
promisingly, 30% said that they would disclose the truth to their children, with the 
motivating factor being "honesty".56 The government therefore needs to consider 
how it can act to provide legislative support for the social parents to further embrace 
the concept of openness. 
3 The Infertile Couple 
The following are the main arguments oft-quoted in support of the maintenance of 
secrecy. 
53 E. Blyth, Secrets and Lies: Barriers to the exchange ofgenetic origins information following donor 
assisted conception A&F 23 ( 1999) 49. 
54 E. Haimes, Recreating the Family? Policy considerations relating to the "new" reproductive 
technologies in M MacNeil, I. Varcoe & S. Yearley, The New Reproductive Technologies, London: 
London, 1990. 
55 Op cit, Cook eta!, fn 52. 
56 R. D. Nachingall, G. Becker, S.S. Quiroga & J.M. Tschann, The Disclosure Decision: concerns and 
issues of parents of children conceived through donor insemination (1998) 199 American Joumal of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 1165. 
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o Fear of societal stigmatisation of the 01 parents 
0 Fear of social stigmatisation of the 01 child 
0 Allows the 01 parents to avoid the emotional difficulties of publicly 
acknowledging their infertility 
o Supposedly to protect the 01 child from the emotional and psychological 
impact of disclosure of the truth 
e Fear of rejection of the Dl parents in favour of the genetic parents 
• Allows the 01 parents to have a "child of their own ''57 
Promisingly, all of these arguments stem from attitudes which are susceptible to 
change and which could be changed if the issues surrounding these apparent 
justifications were addressed in any future legal regulation. How then can we get rid 
of secrecy as the status quo? 
The first point is that, within the field of AID, the use of donated sperm far 
outweighs the use of donated ova and embryos58 and consequently, it is the infertile 
man who is most protected by this policy of secrecy, therefore it is attitudes towards 
male infertility that need to be highlighted and addressed.59 Empirical evidence 
shows a significant difference in attitudes between men and women in DI families 
towards secrecy and donor anonymity. For example, a study in Holland found that 
57 Op cit, Overall, fn 27. 
58 See the HFE Authority's website- www.hfea.gov.uk. 
59 For example, women facing fertility problems are still more likely to consider adoption than men, 
suggesting that they are less preoccupied with genetic links. See M. Stan worth, Reproductive 
Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, p22 and C. Crowe, 
Women want it: in vitro fertilisation and women's motivations for participation in P. Spallone & D.L. 
Sternberg ( eds ), Made to Order, Oxford: Pergamon, 1987, p87. 
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men, more often than women, are very secretive about the use of a donor and men 
more often than women are in favour of donor anonymity.60 
One possible reason for this is that, within Western societies, there has always 
traditionally been a preoccupation with paternity and the protection of the purity of 
the patriarchal line within a family. Both legally and socially, much significance has 
been placed on male fertility and its connotations of virility and power. 61 
Consequently, male infertility has always been considered a source of shame and 
embarrassment and the discovery of such within a couple can lead to feelings of male 
pride and masculinity being greatly damaged,62 with enormous repercussions for the 
emotional and psychological well being of both male and female partners. 
If we were to ask most men, they would probably be inclined to say that 
parenthood means genetic parenthood, therefore it is unsurprising that an inability to 
parent can lead to the feelings of loss and failure described by some infertile men. 
Unsurprising also that, because of this attitude, the first thought of many of the men 
who take part in the fertility process is that they may want to keep the means of their 
child's conception a secret. The use of donated sperm is seen as shameful and 
breaking a taboo, because it also requires acknow I edging the fact that third party male 
masturbation has played a fundamental part in the 01 child's conception, ergo it is 
something that must remain a secret.63 Interestingly, research shows that when donor 
sperm is used to achieve conception, the infertile male places much greater emphasis 
on using a donor from a similar background and with similar characteristics, than 
60 A. Brewaeys, S. Golombok, N. Naaktgeboren, J.K. de Bruyn & E.V. van Hall, Donor Insemination: 
Dutch parents' opinions about confidentiality and donor anonymity and the emotional adjustment of 
their children (1997) 12 HR 1591. 
61 J. Dewar, Fathers in Law? The Case ofA!D in op cit, Lee & Morgan, fu 39. 
62 R. Snowden & E. Snowden, The Gift of a Chid, London: Allen & Unwin, 1984. The Warnock 
Committee also felt that a change in attitude towards male fertility was needed - Department of Health 
& Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquily into Human Fertilisation and Embi)'Oiogy, 
Cmnd 9414 London: HMSO, 1984, para 4.28. 
63 1. Thevoz, The rights of children to information in D. Evans (ed), Creating the Child, The Hague: 
Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1996, p 198. 
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women who use donor ova, again highlighting their apparent concern in covering up 
the truth.64 
There is also a heavy preoccupation with legal paternity in the UK. Within legal 
discourse, conclusive evidence of genetic paternity has always been considered 
important for reasons of legitimacy and for ownership and succession issues.65 
However, the HFEA 1990 has already successfully addressed the issue of any donor 
offspring's legitimacy. The legislation clearly states that the legal father of the child 
is the husband of the woman seeking fertility treatment, not the sperm donor. 66 As 
such, there can be no need to hide the true nature of the conception on legitimacy 
grounds. Furthermore, implicit within the HFEA 1990, is the recognition that an 
intention to parent can displace the blood tie67 as the test of parentage, demonstrating 
that there is an acceptance that the social parent's role is equally important to the 
genetic parent's role within the "new" family. 68 
An added difficulty is the influence of the clinical professionals over the social 
parents. For instance, some practitioners have been documented as saying that if the 
social parents were to keep quiet then there would be, "no reason for him or her ever 
to know that he or she was conceived by donor insemination. "69 Furthermore, in the 
past some clinicians seem to have viewed a prospective parent's intention to be open 
with their child as so averse that it would be an indication of their unsuitability for 
treatment - surely an illogical viewpoint in this far more enlightened age? 
Institutionalised ideas about the doctor/patient relationship could be said to influence 
64 V.A. Adair & A. Purdie, Donor insemination programmes with personal donor: issues olsecrecy 
(1996) II HR 2558. 
65 See Russell v Russell [1924] AC 687. 
66 Op cit, fu 10. 
67 See C. Barton & G. Douglas, Law and Parenthood, London: Butterworths, 1995, p51 - "the extent 
to which legal recognition is given to a person's intention or desire to be regarded as a parent . ... . has 
increased over time, so that it is now the primary test of/ega/ parentage" (emphasis added). 
oR Op cit, Overall, fn 27, p206. 
69 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Donor Insemination, RCOG London, 1987, p3. 
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a patient's response to the doctor's opinion, because often it is taken for granted that 
h h . h . 70 w at t ey say goes Wit out questiOn. Even the legislators seem to have bowed to 
the opinion of the medical professionals in this field. 71 It needs to be remembered 
that these medical professionals are primarily concerned with the process of 
procreation and not the social process of forming a family. This focus on providing a 
cure, and also the lack of follow-up services for the newly-formed family, due in part 
to confidentiality issues, means that the promotion of services in terms of a successful 
conception rate often takes precedence over the consideration of the longer-term 
effects on the individuals involved. 
With these considerations in mind, what practical legal measures can be put in 
place to move away from secrecy? This would depend on whether the state decides 
to take a private ordering or a state regulation approach to the issue. This refers to 
Barton and Douglas' theory of a state regulation continuum, with minimal 
intervention at one end and interventionist measures at the other. 72 It is hereby 
argued that the nature of the rights at issue within the AID sphere, would warrant 
some interventionist measures on the part of the government, to protect the rights of 
the AID child, despite concerns expressed by some commentators that this type of 
approach may not be feasible or equitable. 73 Therefore, it is recommended that the 
first step for the government would be to examine the prospect of a change in the 
current birth registration system, to allow for them to be annotated "by donation", 
thereby providing an effective legal mechanism for enforcing the rights of the AID 
child to be told of their status. Secondly, to allow for follow-up visits to the AID 
70 See the comments of Frances Price in Beyond clinical expertise: social and legal concerns in 
assisted conception ( 1994) JCL 68. 
71 See the comments of Erica Haimes about the response of the Wamock Committee and those 
implementing the HFE Bill in the 1980's - Gamete Donation and the social management of genetic 
origins in M. Stacey (ed), Changing Human Reproduction, Sage Publications, 1992. 
72 Op cit, Barton & Douglas, fn 67, pp50 et seq. 
73 See further P. Glazebrook, Human Beginnings [ 1984] CLJ 209, p211. 
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family by an experienced professional, such as a social worker or psychologist, at 
certain stages during the donor offspring's childhood, to persistently encourage the 
AID parents to inform their child of their status at as early an age as possible. 
Finally, to respect and support the rights of the social parents by providing increased, 
improving, ongoing counselling, following a model postulated on encouragement as 
well as enforcement. 
Current legislation already provides for some limited counselling within the AID 
family. The HFEA Code of Practice74 provides for three types of counselling for the 
prospective parents: implicatory, support and therapeutic counselling, and such 
counselling must be offered to everyone before they consent to the fertility 
treatment. 75 However, although the evidence seems to show that much of this 
counselling is geared towards increased openness in the family relationships, some 
commentators have suggested that this measure has been unsuccessful because of its 
superficiality and, more importantly, the fact that it does little to actively discourage 
the prevailing ethos of secrecy. 76 
4 The Rights of the A.I.D. Parents? 
Even if convinced of the arguments cited in favour of secrecy, this paper does not 
accept that they warrant a right to secrecy for AID parents. Furthermore, any alleged 
rights of the AID parents should not be allowed to override the rights of the AID child 
on the basis of secrecy alone. The main rights at issue here are those of the social 
parents to respect for their private and family lives under Article 8 ECHR - these 
74 2"d Revision, 1995, Pat1 6. 
75 Ibid. section 1.3(6), para 3(1 )(a). 
76 E. Blyth, Infertility and Assisted Conception: Practice Issues for Counsellors, Birmingham: British 
Association of Social Workers, 1995, p67. 
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would appear to be at odds with the proposition that donor offspring should have the 
right to be told about their status. 
Arguably, both private and family life issues are engaged in this instance. 77 Any 
proposed alteration of the birth certificate could interfere with the social parents' 
private lives because it pertains to information regarding their identification as legal 
parents, thereby relating to their own identity issues. 78 Compulsory counselling and 
follow-up visits to ensure that the donor becomes aware of their status could also be 
seen to impinge on their private lives because of the perceived interventionist nature 
of these approaches. Furthermore, family life, which could easily be established 
within the social family given the close personal ties and de facto family relationships 
therein/9 could also be affected if the social parents were to argue that granting the DI 
child the right to be told might cause distress for any/all of the family members. 
Therefore it seems that the social parents would be able to found an argument in 
relation to Article 8 ECHR on either of these grounds. 80 
Further, given the strength of evidence presented in chapter 3 regarding the AID 
child's needs and rights relating to their personal identity, it would seem unjustified to 
allow the rights of the social parents to prevail. One could therefore point to a 
justification for the alleged breaches described above, in Article 8(2), that the 
suggested measures are for the, "rights and protections of others," i.e. the DI child. 
In this instance there would have to be a balancing exercise of the rights of both 
parties and it is this balancing act that has proved to be the crux of the matter. 
77 No definition of either of these concepts is actually contained within the ECHR. 
78 Protected under Article 8, ECHR, as being a component of an individual's private life - Mikulic v 
Croatia (2002) App. No. 53176/99 2002, paras 52-53. 
79 Marckx v Belgium [1979] 2 EHRR 330. 
80 X. Y & Z v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 143. 
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The case of X, Y and Z v UK1 provides a good example of how such an exercise 
might be carried out. X was a post-operative female-to-male transsexual, who 
together with his partner Y, received licensed fertility treatment and conceived Z 
following AID. However, the Registrar General refused to allow X to be registered 
as the legal father, taking the view that only a biological male could be so registered. 
X, Y and Z together alleged a breach of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. The majority of 
the court found no violation on the basis of the wide margin of appreciation afforded 
to State Parties concerning the sphere of AID, but it is not the main decision that is of 
interest here. A disagreement arose between Judges Pettiti and Foighel regarding the 
apparent conflict between the rights of the parents and the rights of the child. Judge 
Pettiti advanced concerns over the independent interests of the child Z, suggesting 
that more weight should have been given to those interests and that possibly Z should 
have been separately represented because it was not obvious to the court that it was in 
the child's best interests for X to be recognised as the father. In other words, the 
registration of X as the legal father might impede Z's identity rights, should she wish 
to gain more information about her genetic father in the future. This discussion is 
itself interesting because it demonstrates a tacit recognition of the AID child's identity 
rights, but, underlying this, it also highlights the inherent difficulties of resolving the 
conflict of rights that can sometimes occur between family members. 
In such a conflict a State's usual concern is to protect the rights of the weaker 
party, i.e. the child, but it will often seek to justify its policies on the basis that they 
protect the rights of the family. 82 Recognition of the interests of the child is 
enshrined within domestic law in the Children Act 198983 - the interests of the child 
81 Ibid. 
82 For example, B. R & J v Federal Republic of Germany App 9639/82 D & R 36, pl30; Jofie & 
Lebrun v Belgium Application 11418/85 D & R 4 7, p243; Rasmussen v Denmark 7 EHRR 3 71. 
83 Section I. 
88 
being paramount. This approach is further reinforced by Article 3 of the UNCRC -
in general, "the interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. " However, 
the rights relating to family life as expressed in the European Convention appear not 
to be weighted in favour of either the child or the parent, making the conflict between 
AID child and AID parent even more difficult to resolve. Jurisprudence from the 
European Court suggests that, where the rights and interests of the family members 
pull in opposite directions, then the best interests of the child become of crucial 
importance. Over twenty years ago Hendriks v Netherlandi4 established that where 
there was a serious conflict between the child and one of its parents, that could only 
be resolved to the disadvantage of one of them, the interests of the child had to prevail 
under Article 8(2). This principle has also been taken into account in the UK courts 
post-implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998, in relation to domestic violence 
issues in Re L (Contact:Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact:Domestic Violence); Re 
M (Contact:Domestic Violence); Re H (Contact:Domestic Violencel5 and explicitly 
referred to in Re T (Paternity:Ordering Blood Testsl6 - a case that has already been 
shown to have a number of parallels to the position of DI families and could be 
alluded to in future AID identity disputes. 
It is difficult to say how these decisions will be interpreted in the future; even the 
decision anticipated in Rose87 may have little to say on the subject, given the fact that 
the social parents of both parties in that case are not objecting to the application to 
receive more non-identifying information. Regardless of the outcome in Rose, this 
paper maintains that the rights of the AID child should supersede the rights of the 
social parents. Evidence has shown that they have a fundamental right to an identity 
84 ( 1983) EHRR 223. See also Johansen v Norway ( 1996) EHRR 72. 
85 [2000] 2 FLR 334. 
86 [2001] 2 FLR 1190. 
87 R(Rose & Another) v Secretmy of State for Health & Human Fertilisation and Emb1yology Authority 
[2002] EWHC (Admin). 
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and the only effective way of doing this would be to provide a legal mechanism for 
encouraging and enforcing the social parents to embrace the concept of openness and 
tell the child of their status, thereby giving them the opportunity to access information 
relating to their genetic background. 
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5. Tlhle Donor 
Under the HFEA 1990 the anonymity of the donor is almost always guaranteed. 1 
Therefore, if the donor offspring were to be granted the right to receive information 
about their donor(s), how would this impact on the donor's rights- to confidentiality,2 
respect for their private life3 and respect for their family life?4 
]_ Tlhle UK Donor 
Earlier chapters have demonstrated that there are strong arguments for allowing 
AID children to access information relating to their genetic origins, justifiable on two 
grounds: firstly, their fundamental need5 and right to an identity6 and secondly, the 
importance of having ongoing access to information relating to their medical history. 7 
What kinds of information regarding the donor should be made available on these 
bases considering that information about gamete donors can be divided into two types 
- identifying and non-identifying - and that both can have an equally important role 
in the DI child's life? 
Identifying information would include the name, date of birth and address of the 
donor, from which a donor could possibly be traced and contacted. 8 However, this 
1 HFEA, s 35. 
2 HFEA, ss 33 and 41. 
3 Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
4 Ibid. 
5 See J. Triseliotis, In Search of Origins, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 
6 Under Articles 7 and 8 ofthe United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). 
7 See further S. Simpson, Truth and the Child: a genetic per5pective in E Blyth, M. Crawshaw & J. 
Speirs (eds), Tntth and the Child 10 Years On: Information exchange in donor assisted conception, 
Birmingham: British Association of Social Workers, 1998. 
8 Future Regulations may need to take into account that the address of the donor may have changed 
since the time of the donation, although if we are discussing the right to information, not contact, the 
HFE Authority may be under a duty to ensure the accuracy of the address, if it were to disclose any 
identifying information. 
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paper does not propose that contact should be an automatic right of the donor 
offspring. Being identified as a child's genetic parent does not mean that a social 
relationship should necessarily follow, as the existence of a genetic tie does not of 
itself merit the creation of a social relationship.9 Non-identifying information could 
include such things as eye and hair colour and other physical characteristics, as well 
as occupation, religious and ethnic background and personal interests. 
All spern1 and egg donors accepted by a treatment centre are currently required to 
fill out a donor information form. This form is completed and returned to the HFEA, 
so that information about a donor can be entered and stored on the HFEA's register, 
established on 1 August 1991, and containing data concerning patients, donors and 
children conceived by means of AID only as of that date. 10 On the form, the donor 
must fill in his/her name, address and age, thereby enabling the HFE Authority to 
identify the specific donor from each treatment cycle. Therefore, the Authority does 
already have the identifying information available. Some might argue that the very 
fact that this data has already been collected and is waiting to be accessed is reason 
enough to allow the information to be made available; at the very least the HFE 
Authority could not argue that collecting and retaining this data would be an 
unreasonable demand upon their resources, when this is already a part of the donation 
process. Indeed, it seems paradoxical that the HFE Authority should have gone to 
the time, effort and expense of collection and retention of this data, in circumstances 
dictating the need for stringent security measures, if the possibility of disclosure of 
this information was never considered. 
9 See the discussion of the European Court of Human Rights in M v Netherlands (1993) 74 DR 120. 
10 The Department of Health has set up a pilot scheme allowing for the establishment of a voluntary 
contact register for those involved in AID pre-1990- www.UKDonorLink.org.uk. 
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The non-identifying information currently obtained by the HFE Authority from 
donors is very limited. 11 There is a section where donors can write something about 
themselves and a description of their lives and interests, 12 with the intention that it 
could 13 be passed on to any child born as a result of their donation. 14 Donors are 
encouraged to provide: 
" .. . a brief description of yourself as a person. This should be something, which 
could be passed on to any child born as a result of your help. It may also be seen by 
the parents. " 
Therefore the HFEA collects: 
" .. . additional, non-identijjJing information [about the donor] because it may be 
helpfid to children born following treatment with your eggs or sperm who want to 
gain some insight into their genetic origins. With this in mind the Authority collects 
general information about what you look like. It also offers the opportunity to 
describe yourself and your interests more .fidly in your own words if you think that 
could be helpful to a child born as a result of your donation. If Parliament in the 
future makes this decision, such a child after reaching the age of 18, could contact the 
HFEAfor information. "15 
11 Some centres do collect more information; see E. Blyth, Infertility and Assisted Conception: Practice 
Issues for Counsellors, Birmingham: British Association of Social Workers, 1995, p67. 
12 This includes ethnic group, eye colour, hair colour, skin colour, height, weight, occupation and 
interests (notably, only one line is provided for listing interests - perhaps an indication of how little 
value is currently attributed to this type of information- HFEA Donor Information Form 91 (4). 
13 Should Regulations be enacted. 
14 The HFEA Code of Practice, 4111 edition, July 1998, London: HFEA, para 3.43, states that donors 
should be encouraged to provide non-identifying infonnation about themselves. 
15 HFEA Leaflet, Sperm and Egg Donors and the Law, December 1992. 
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Guidance from the HFE Authority suggests that this information could include 
further details about the donor's interests, family background, childhood and region of 
origin etc. However, the amount of space on the form for this type of information is 
very limited 16 and, as the form makes clear, this self-description by the donor ts 
completely optional. 
Recent studies have shown that only a small number of donors complete this 
section of the form. MacLean and MacLean 17 found that less than 20% of donors 
were completing this descriptive section. However, some of the larger centres 
offering reproductive treatment using donated gametes had a higher completion rate, 
suggesting that the culture at these centres might be more geared towards information 
provlSlon. MacLean and MacLean suggest that it could be an institutional factor 
affecting completion rate, with low completion rates from centres with lower numbers 
of successful donations, perhaps reflecting their size and experience. 18 In a separate 
study Blyth and Hunt found that treatment centres reported that donors cited several 
reasons for not providing extra information: for example, donors not being interested 
in, or not attaching any significance to, providing further information; donors being 
ambivalent about providing information about themselves; and donors fearing that 
non-identifying information could compromise their anonymity. 19 
Undoubtedly however, if Regulations were to be enacted, so as to allow for 
retrospective disclosure of non-identifying information, this optional self-description 
16 Little more than 150 square centimetres, although additional sheets of paper may be attached to the 
original form. 
17 S. MacLean & M. MacLean, Keeping secrets in assisted reproduction- the tension between donor 
anonymity and the need of the child for information [1996] CFLQ 243. 
18 Also, note the low response rate in a study conducted by the Lister In-Vitro Fertilisation Unit, 
London, where 94% of egg donors did not respond to the last question on the form asking for a brief 
description of themselves - see H. Abdalla, F. Shelfield & E. Latarche, Statutmy Information for the 
children burn of oocyte donation in the UK: what will they be told in 2008? ( 1998) 13 HR II 06. 
19 E. Blyth & J. Hunt, Sharing genetic origins information: views fi'Din licensed centres on HFEA 
Donor Information Form 91(4) !3 HR 3274. 
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would form part of the information to be disclosed.2° Consequently, due to the 
optional nature of this section, some AID children may receive descriptions of their 
genetic background whilst others would not - raising questions of equity. Such a 
scenario would be unfair not only to the donor offspring but would also have 
important implications for the other parties involved, i.e. the social parents, who 
might want to tell their child of their origins- "DJ parents [are} often conscious of 
the difficulty of providing an explanation [to their children} in the absence of 
. ,/", . b h d n21 m1 ormatwn a out t e onor. 
The HFEA 1990 currently provides that the HFE Authority may gtve out 
information as is required by Regulations. 22 Regulations could easily be enacted to 
allow for the prospective provision of non-identifying information; further there 
seems a strong argument to allow for prospective provision of identifying 
information, although in this instance, there would need to be a greater consideration 
of the competing rights of the donor. There is much greater resistance however to the 
proposition that identifying information could be retrospectively disclosed, 23 on the 
grounds that it would breach the donors' rights to respect for their private and family 
life. Some have argued that it is unlikely that children in this situation will ever be 
able to gain access to any such information. Lee and Morgan have gone so far as to 
call these donor offspring, "hostages to the reproductive revolution, "24 since full 
parliamentary debate and alternative primary legislation would be required for such a 
change. 
20 Op cit, MacLean & MacLean, fn 17, pp245-6. 
21 R. Cook, S. Go1ombok, A. Bish & C. Murray, Disclosure of Donor Insemination: parental attitudes 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 65 ( 1995) 549. 
22 HFEA 1990, s 31(4)(a). 
23 Ibid, s 31(5). 
24 D. Morgan & R. Lee, Blackstone's Guide to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 
London: Blackstone Press Ltd, 1991. 
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The issues surrounding disclosure of information, particularly identifying 
information are extremely contentious. Looking back to 1984, the Warnock 
Committee found it difficult to decide what type of information should be made 
available to donor offspring about their genetic background. 25 They recognised that, 
"it was wrong to deceive children about their origins, "26 and that secrets could, 
''undermine the whole network of family relationships," but they were not prepared to 
take the next logical step and recognise that AID children should have the right to 
information about their genetic parent(s). It concluded that no identifying 
information about the donor should be made available to a child born by donation.27 
Therefore, whilst implicitly supporting the principle that donor offspring should be 
told the truth about their conception, it is obvious, both from the recommendations of 
the Warnock Committee and subsequent legislation, that the donor's identity is, and 
always has been, protected much more stringently than that of the patient parent or of 
any child born.28 
Several things emerge from the current rules relating to the collection and retention 
of donor information. Firstly, there is a strong argument for encouraging, or even 
enforcing, standardised practices within the licensed clinics; at present the importance 
of the completion of the donor information form is undervalued and the HFE 
Authority needs to do more to ensure that the treatment centres and the donors 
understand the relevance of the information contained therein. 
Secondly, the government needs to strongly consider making the completion of 
this "pen portrait" section of the donor information form compulsory. Some might 
25 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology, Cmnd 9414, London: HMSO, 1984. 
26 Ibid, p21. 
27 Ibid, para 4.26. 
2
x For further discussion of this point see I. Kennedy & A. Grubb, Medical Law: Text with Materials, 
London: Buttcrworths, 1994, p793. 
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argue against this, given the impact that this may have on the donor's right to respect 
for their private lives.29 However, it must be acknowledged that all donors have a 
choice whether or not to donate; if they object to the compulsory nature of the 
provision of this information, they can choose not to donate. It therefore seems 
difficult to argue that there would be a breach of their rights under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Admittedly, there is a concern that, if too 
many donors objected and chose not to donate, this could lead to a fall in the overall 
number of those donating. However, this leads us to the final point that the 
government needs to consider in the enactment of future Regulations - that there 
needs to be much greater focus on the counselling and advice given to donors at the 
time of donation, as already occurs in other legal jurisdictions. 30 This would help 
them to understand the legal position surrounding donation, i.e. that they will not be 
viewed as the legal father of the donor offspring, and the social consequences that 
may follow from donation, i.e. the fact that they will actually become a "parent". 
The current lack of consistency within AID clinical practices and the reluctance of 
the legislature to make a strong commitment to move away from anonymity and 
embrace the concept of openness means that the rights and interests of the donor 
offspring are often relegated to take greater account of the rights of the donor. A 
conflict of interests is bound to arise in these circumstances and it is the resolution of 
this conflict that will be discussed in the following sections. 
29 A1ticle 7, ECHR. 
30 Infertility Treatment Act I 995 (Vic), ss 12, I 3, 16 and I 7. 
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2 Why the Anonymity? 
At the time of the inception of the HFEA 1990, anonymity was considered 
necessary, firstly to prevent the donor from believing that they would have any 
financial or parental responsibility for the donor offspring;31 secondly, because, 
without the protection of anonymity, insufficient donors (men in particular) would be 
prepared to donate their gametes. 32 This last ground for anonymity has long been 
strenuously justified, mainly by the medical professionals, on the basis that anonymity 
is necessary to recruit donors. Also, the policy of anonymity is generally thought to 
reflect an apparent societal concern with the maintenance of the image of a "natural" 
family as the norm. Anonymity, alongside secrecy, allows the social family to 
appear normal and minimise the intervention of any third party donor into the family33 
- something that could be perceived as a threat to the newly-formed family. 
Anonymity protects all the individuals from the apparent threat that providing detailed 
information about the donor might, "introduce the donor as a person in his own 
right, "34 allowing for an unwanted, unnecessary breach of the apparent "normality" of 
the social family. Thirdly, there is still a stigma attached to the reality of this type of 
formation of a family - the process is not 100% natural or ideal and, in the case of 
male sperm donors, it involves masturbation - an unsavoury, unmentionable taboo 
subject.35 Donor anonymity allows these difficult issues to be overlooked by all of 
those involved. 
However, by far the most oft-cited reason for the retention of donor anonymity is 
the justification that anonymity is necessary to maintain a steady supply of donors - in 
31 This is no longer a concern; HFEA, s 28(6)(a) ensures that the donor of sperm is not the legal father 
provided the sperm is used in accordance with the other provisions of the HFEA. 
32 P. Braude, M.H. Johnson & R.J. Aitken Human Fertilisation and Embtyology Bill goes to report 
stage ( 1990) 300 BMJ 1410. 
33 Op cit, fn 25, p25. 
34 Op cit, fn 25. 
35 Sperm donation accounts for approximately 93% of all live DI births- www.hfea.gov.uk. 
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particular male sperm donors, without which the whole process would be unable to 
take place and the medical professionals would be unable to provide assistance and 
care for all of the infertile couples so desperately in need of treatment. Prima facie 
this sounds a very appealing argument - it strikes at the very heart of the proposition 
that we should not prevent the infertile couple from receiving treatment if it would 
deny them their right to found a family. 36 However, is this really a credible argument 
and is there any evidence to support it? Or is the policy of anonymity merely a shield 
to allow the medical professionals to pursue their own research in the way that they 
see fit? 
Whilst there is a great deal of research on this subject, the majority of evidence 
shows that many of the AID clinical professionals are united in their arguments for 
the retention of donor anonymity. It should be mentioned here that donation is not 
always anonymous, since the HFEA 1990 does allow for the use of donor sperm 
where the donor is known to the recipients. However, when deciding whether or not 
to use a known donor, the clinics are directed towards, "the implications for the 
welfare of the child if the donor is personally known within the child's family and 
social circle, "37 suggesting that many clinicians try to avoid open procedures as 
much as possible. 38 
Therefore, is the need for donor anonymity real or artificially constructed? Given 
the academic research and empirical evidence, it would seem that the latter is the case. 
However, to be able to understand the true basis of the policy of anonymity we need 
to examine the studies of donor attitudes that have already been undertaken. These 
studies may not provide a comprehensive insight into the attitudes of all donors, but at 
36 Articles 7 and 12, ECHR. 
37 Op cit, HFEA Code of Practice, fn 14, para 3 .18( c). 
38 See further M. Wamock, A Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985, p82. 
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present they are the only source for determining whether donor anonymity IS 
necessary to protect the supply of gametes and they throw up some interesting and 
contradictory findings. 
Some studies have shown that, if anonymity were removed, a number of donors 
would no longer donate, but that the majority would still do so.39 However, 
Robinson et a/looked at the level of personal involvement of the donors towards their 
act of donation and concluded that, by removing the guarantee of anonymity 
contained within the HFEA 1990 this would damage the numbers of those who were 
'11' d 40 WI mg to onate. Another study highlighted the complex nature of the emotions 
felt by donors towards their acts of donation41 and again confidentiality and 
anonymity were found to be of great importance to the donors. However, 
interestingly donors do not seem to regard the fact of their donation as a secret. A 
study conducted in one clinic found that 80% of gamete donors had told their friends, 
relatives and doctors,42 others had even told their stories in the public sphere.43 
Notably, and perhaps a factor which further complicates matters, studies have 
shown that there are marked differences between the attitudes and motivations of 
sperm and egg donors. There are however, a number of possible reasons for this. It 
has been suggested that men and women regard their gametes in different ways: 
firstly, for biological reasons, i.e. women produce one egg a month, whilst men will 
release millions of sperm each time they ejaculate, therefore possibly women view 
their gametes as a much more valuable "commodity" than men. Furthermore, the 
39 A. Kirkland et a/, Comparison of attitudes of donors and recipients to oocyte donation (1992) 7 HR 
355; J.N. Robinson eta/, Attitudes of donors and recipients to gamete donation (1991) 6 HR 307. 
40 J.N. Robinson, R.G. Fonnan, A.M. Clarke, D.M. Egan, M.G. Chapman & D.H. Barlow, Anonymity 
of gamete donors: a sun1e_v of attitudes (1990) JRF 67, abstract 5. 
41 L. R. Schover, S.A. Rothmann & R.L. Collins, The personality and motivation of sperm donors: a 
comparison with oocyte donors (1992) 7 HR 575. 
42 M. Power eta/, A comparison of the attitudes of volunteer donors and infertile patient donors on an 
ovum donation programme ( 1990) 5 HR 352. 
43 See J .Blizzard, Blizzard and the Holy Ghost, Peter Owen, 1977. 
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way that the donation of sperm and eggs takes place is hugely different. To extract 
eggs from a woman, she has to undergo drug treatments to stimulate her ovaries into 
extra egg production and then undergo an invasive surgical procedure,44 thereby 
facing medical risks that male sperm donors are not exposed to. 45 Sperm donation 
involves the simple, painless, indeed pleasurable, act of masturbation- although there 
is a certain amount of stigma attached to sperm donation. This fact generally means 
that men who donate tend to be regarded with greater suspicion,46 possibly generating 
negative emotions on the part of these men towards the act of their donation -
something that might be avoided if there was a greater degree of openness and 
acceptance in this whole area. 
There also seem to be gender differences in a man and woman's motivation to 
donate. As we have seen men tend to donate anonymously, whilst many women tend 
to donate for family and friends. 47 Plus, in general, men may feel more detached 
from the recipients of their gametes and any resulting children; in fact, Lui et a/ 
suggest that some donors are, "naYve towards their donation. '48 Legally, it is 
possible for donors to specify some characteristics of the recipients of their donation, 
for example requesting a specific age group. However, the study conducted by Lui et 
a! showed that only 7% of male sperm donors were interested in having a say in the 
selection of the recipients if this was possible. Furthermore, 87% had no desire in 
meeting the resulting children and only 2% said that they would welcome any regular 
contact with the donor offspring. However, in another study conducted by Price and 
44 B.H. Smith & I.D. Cooke, Ovarian Hyperstimulation: actual and theoretical risks (1991) BMJ 127. 
45 S.C. Lui, & S.M. Weaver, Attitudes and motives of semen donors and non-donors (1996) 11 HR 
2061. 
46 E. Haimes, Recreating the Fami~y? Policy considerations relating to the new reproductive 
technologies in M. McNeil, I. Varcoe & S. Yearley (eds), The New Reproductive Technologies, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990. 
47 See further L. Nelson, Truth and the Surrogate Child, in op cit, Blyth eta/, fn 7. 
48 Op cit, Lui eta/, fn 45. ~' 101~~,' 
Cook,49 it was found that almost 66% of the women questioned who had donated 
anonymously, would have liked to have known something about the outcome of their 
donation. In comparison to the sperm donor's apparent lack of consideration for the 
consequences of their actions, these women were able to envisage a future child born 
of their donation and had concerns about the child itself and the family it would be 
born into. 50 These differences may be attributed to inherent biological and 
psychological reasons or socially constructed stereotypes of the roles that men and 
women play as parents; this is not the main issue. What needs to be focussed upon is 
how future legal regulation can encourage both of these groups to consider the 
repercussions of their actions to an even greater extent? 
One method would be to provide much more extensive counselling for the donor 
prior to donation. Currently, under the HFEA 1990, prospective donors must be 
offered counselling before they donate, although there is no obligation for them to 
take up this offer. However, in practice, some licensed treatment centres may not 
accept individuals as donors unless they do undertake some counselling. During 
counselling, prospective donors (and recipients) are, "invite[d]. . . to consider . . . the 
advantages and disadvantages of openness about the procedures envisaged, "51 and, 
"to consider in particular . . . their perception of the needs of any children born as a 
result of their donation. "52 One consideration is how counselling could be improved 
to import the message that the welfare of the future offspring must be a paramount 
consideration in the whole process. 53 
49 F. Price & R. Cook, The donor, the recipient and the child- human egg donation in UK licensed 
centres [1995] CFLQ 145. 
50 Ibid, pl49. 
51 Op cit, fn 14, p39. 
52 Ibid, p40, 6.16d. 
53 Unfortunately, in practice, treatment centres are often left to interpret these provisions in the way that 
they see fit and research has shown that the emphasis on the provision of non-directive counselling 
means that counselling about openness is unlikely to be provided by the centres. 
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Another complicating issue is the factor that financial incentives seem to be 
important for sperm donors, as evidenced in the study conducted by Lui et a!, 
although admittedly the payment that donors receive is not a great amount. 54 Section 
12( e) of the HFEA 1990 states that no money or other benefit may be derived from 
gametes and embryos, except in accordance with HFEA provisions. 55 There have 
been moves by the HFEA to recruit more altruistic donors, however, it was agreed in 
1999 that the withdrawal of payments might impact negatively on the supply of 
donors. 56 Indeed, one UK study did try to recruit altruistic donors, through 
newspaper and radio advertising campaigns and leaflet distribution, but the number of 
donors recruited was very low. 57 It seems that the stereotypical image ofthe majority 
of sperm donors consisting of impoverished, but easily accessible, medical students 
may be true. The second question therefore is how we can create a situation whereby 
they would be less inclined to concentrate on the financial incentives and more 
inclined to consider the future well-being of their genetic offspring? 
As we can see the results of these various studies are contradictory but they do 
demonstrate a certain reluctance on the part of the donors to relinquish their 
anonymity, possibly due to the influence of the medical professionals involved and a 
lack of consistent advice from the licensed clinics regarding the implications of their 
donation. For example, there is likely to be an uncertainty on the part of the donors 
about the social role and relationship they might have with the child/children58 should 
54 After a recent Consultation exercise, the HFEA decided to retain the figure of£ 15 per donation, plus 
reasonable expenses- HFEA Annual Report, 1999. 
55 A Direction issued by the Authority in August 1991 regularised payments for both men and women-
up to£ 15 for men and for women, '"benefits in kind'", such as free sterilisation or IVF treatment. 
56 See also S. Ramsay, Experts advise on payment for gametes in the UK (1995) 345 The Lancet 1498. 
57 E.A. MacLaughlin, J. Day, A. Harrison, J. Mitchell, C. Prosser & M. Hull, Recruitment ofgamete 
donors and payment of expenses (1997) HR 12 1842. 
58 Donor spem1 may be used in multiple attempts at conception, leading to the possibility that they may 
be faced with several genetic offspring - another issue that needs to be tackled in future regulation, 
given that one way to discourage donors from accepting anonymity would be for them to face the 
prospect of multiple donor offspring contacting them in later life. 
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their identity be revealed. Changes in attitudes on these matters are likely to be slow 
and the individuals involved need to be given all the assistance and encouragement 
that they can by the state, in the form of increased information, advice and counselling 
about the implications of the donation, to recognise that anonymity is not the only 
option. 
A second argument in favour of a move away from anonymity pertains to the 
lessons learned in other jurisdictions. The Swedish Act on Artificial Insemination 
1985 gave children born by means of AID the right to know the identity of the sperm 
donor, when they were sufficiently mature (no age being specified), justified by 
reference to the fact that the rights of the AID child should override the rights of the 
other individuals involved, including the donor's right to anonymity. 59 Plus, contrary 
to practices in UK treatment centres, the prospective recipients of the gametes must be 
evaluated by clinicians regarding their ability to foresee the consequences for their 
child. They must also be willing to tell the child of its origins, although they are not 
legally required to do so. Unfortunately, the Swedish legislation has proved to be 
fallible in this respect, given that in a recent study of 148 Swedish couples who had 
given birth to an AID child, 90% had said that they had not told their children.60 
Notably, however, for the purposes of this chapter, the prospect of disclosure did 
not harm the numbers of individuals willing to donate, something that is oft-cited by 
the clinicians as the main reason for retaining anonymity. In Sweden there was 
opposition to the legislation because of a concern that donation would be discouraged; 
although numbers did initially fall, they have gradually increased again since 1985 
and, interestingly, the demographic of the majority of those who now donate appears 
to have changed from young students to mature men who seem to be more 
59 D. Bradley, Family Law and Political Culture, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, pll2. 
60 C. Gottlieb eta!, Disclosure of donor insemination to the child: the impact ofSwedish legislation on 
couples (2002) 15 HR 2052. 
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altruistically motivated. 61 From this perspective it is worth giving further thought to 
the consequences of the removal of anonymity and not automatically assuming that it 
would be detrimental to the process of AID. 
Other research has shown that donors' attitudes to the disclosure of information 
about them may not be so wholly entrenched in their minds as the clinicians and 
lawmakers would have us believe. In the study by Lui et al, in response to the 
statement, "I would not mind if donor offspring were given details of my physical 
characteristics, attitudes and personal interests," 82% said that they would be willing 
to provide non-identifying information. Even more encouragingly, in another New 
Zealand study, 78% of known sperm donors agreed to being identified to their donor 
offspring, provided that there were restrictions on the age at which this information 
would be made available to the child. 62 
However, practical measures are still needed to move away from donor anonymity. 
It is hereby proposed that the government should consider a two-pronged approach. 
Firstly, to force donors to accept the concept of openness, Regulations must be 
enacted to allow for disclosure of genetic information to donor offspring. Secondly, 
to acknowledge the donor's contribution to society, the government should examine 
ways in which principles could be enshrined in future legal regulation to allow for 
increased donor counselling and to re-define the concept of being a parent, thereby 
accepting that, "the issue of biological parentage should be divorced from 
h I . I ,63 psyc o og1ca parentage. 
Bainham 's academic analysis of the issues of parentage, parenthood and parental 
responsibility provides a sound basis for the way in which society could begin to 
61 A. McWhinnie, Who am I? Genealogical disadvantage for children fimn donated gametes in op cit, 
Blyth eta/, fn 7, p72. 
62 V .A. Adair & A. Purdie, Donor insemination programmes with personal donor: issues of secrecy, 
(1996) II HR 2558. 
63 Per Ward LJ, Re H: (Paternity: Ordering Blood Tests) [1996] 2 FLR 65. 
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evaluate the way that it views the notion of "being a parent. "64 He proposes an 
inclusive approach that would incorporate different but complimentary notions of 
genetic and social parenthood and he also stresses the role of the state in establishing 
and protecting the genetic connection between donor and donor offspring. He 
suggests the reformulation of the existing legal concept of parentage, which would be 
reserved for the genetic parent(s). Moreover, this would not interfere with the fact of 
the social parents' legal parenthood or with the notion of parental responsibility 
under the Children Act 1989,65 but would serve to reinforce the proposition that the 
donor does indeed have an important role as one kind of parent, which may in tum 
lead to a gradual recognition among donors that anonymity cannot continue to prevail. 
3 The Rights of the Donor? 
Despite the fact that there are some persuasive arguments m favour of donor 
anonymity, the apparent need and desire for such does not warrant its elevation to the 
status of a right and, even if one could point to such a right, e.g. under Article 8 
ECHR, it should not automatically override the rights of the donor offspring to 
genetic background information. 
If information were to be made available to donor offspring, this may raise issues 
regarding the donor's right to respect for their "private life "66 - the disclosure of non-
identifying and identifying information relates directly to their identity and privacy 
interests.67 Notions of "family life" may not be at stake here; even though it is 
64 A. Bainham, Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: subtle, elusive yet important 
distinctions in A. Bainham, S. Day Sclater & M. Richards (eds), What is a Parent? A socio-legal 
analysis, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999. 
65 Section 3( I). 
66 Ar1icle 8 ECHR. 
67 Mikulic v Croatia (2002) App No 53176/99 2002, paras 52-53. 
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accepted that a blood tie would create a strong presumption of family life68 and that 
cohabitation of the family members is not essential for family life to be established,69 
there must also be evidence of sufficient constancy in a relationship to point to de 
facto family ties. 70 The decision in M v Netherlands,71 relating to a sperm donor's 
application for contact established that sperm donation, even when coupled with 
occasional visits to an AID child, did not create a sufficiently close personal tie to be 
regarded as family life. 
As regards the argument that disclosure of information breaches the donor's right 
to respect for their private life, this needs to be explored further in relation to the 
different types of information that might need to be available. Given that the 
possibility of the provision of non-identifYing information on a prospective and 
retrospective basis was included in the HFEA 1990, provision of this type of 
information should not constitute a breach, as all donors are fully aware of the 
possibility of Regulations being enacted and have impliedly consented to this 
proposition. 
The main difficulty lies in relation to the provision of identifying information, as 
this has not been adequately provided for in legislation. Certainly, retrospective 
disclosure would cause problems relating to principles of foreseeability and this may 
make it impossible to incorporate enforced disclosure into future legislation, although 
one may be able to point to a positive duty on the state to provide a voluntary 
information/contact register for past donors and donor offspring. Prospective 
disclosure could be more easily contemplated but would still entail a balancing of the 
rights of the donor and donor offspring. Recent domestic and European court 
68 Keegan v b·e!and {1994) 18 EHRR 342. 
69 Kroon v Netherlands (1994) 17 EHRR 263. 
70 MB v UK Application No 22920/93 (Dec) 6 April 1994. See also Re H:Re G (Adoption Consultation 
of Unmarried Fathers) [200 I] I FLR 646. 
71 Op cit, fn 9. 
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jurisprudence provides an indication of how this balancing exercise may be carried 
out. 
The most pertinent domestic authority is Gunn-Russo v Nugent Care Society and 
Secretmy of State for Health. 72 The claimant was adopted as a child and sought 
judicial review proceedings to obtain disclosure of records held by the adoption 
agency that handled her adoption. She succeeded because the disclosure policy of 
the first defendants was applied without taking account of the individual facts of her 
case. A parallel can be drawn between this case and the position of AID children, 
although Gunn-Russo dealt with the provision of information from third parties and 
did not engage Article 8 ECHR. The confidentiality interests of these third parties 
were relegated in favour of the adoptee and dicta implied that the case for disclosure 
to AID children could be even stronger given that information about genetic parent(s) 
is, "something that goes to the ve1y heart of their identity, and to their make up as 
I ,73 peop e. 
However, recent European jurisprudence has upheld notions of a genetic parent's 
general right to confidentiality. Odievre v France74 concerned an adoptee applying 
for genetic background information, who had been legally abandoned under French 
law, which allows for "birth by an unidentified person" - "accouchement sous X". 
Traditionally, French law allows for the provision of non-identifying information to 
such an applicant but upholds the mother's right to confidentiality. Despite the fact 
that only two other State Parties, Italy and Luxembourg, do not make provision for the 
compulsory registration of the identity of the legal parents, the European Court 
accorded a wide margin of appreciation to the French government and found no 
72 [2001] 1 UKHRR 1320. 
73 Cited with reference to Gunn-Russo in R(Rose & Another) v Secretary of State for Health and 
Human Fertilisation and Emb1yology Authority [2002] EWHC (Admin). 
74 Application No 42326/98 13.2.2003. 
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violation of the applicant's right to respect for their private and family life under 
Article 8 ECHR. 
Prima facie the decision in Odievre seems to be a step in the wrong direction, 
particularly in light of the promising judgements in past cases such as Gaskin 75 and 
Mikulic. 76 However, the applicant was an adult, not a child, and the European Court 
examined the matter on the basis of a conflict of competing adult rights. Had the 
decision concerned a child the outcome may have been different, because the Court 
would have given more weight to a consideration of the child's "best interests". 
Furthermore, there would be nothing to prevent domestic courts from taking a 
dynamic approach in the future and utilising the wide margin of appreciation accorded 
to them in decisions of this nature to advance the rights of donor offspring beyond the 
decision of Odievre to enable them to better protect the rights of the AID child to 
receive information about their genetic background. 
75 Gaskin v United Kingdom (Access to Personal Files) ( 1989) Eur Court HR Ser A No. 10454183, 32 
YB Eur Conv HR 176, 12 EHRR 36. 
76 Op cit, fn 66. 
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6. The Way Forward? 
1 The Consultation Paper 
The relevant governmental Consultation period ended in July 2002 1 and the 
Department of Health has since published a summary of the responses received. 2 23 7 
responses were received and the key message to emerge was that the rights of the 
donor offspring should receive much greater recognition and protection. 
• 211 responses supported the enactment of Regulations in the future to allow 
for the provision of non-identifying information; 17 were against this 
(although some gave their reasons as being that non-identifying information 
was not enough and that identifying information alone would suffice). 
• A majority of respondents agreed that the types of non-identifying 
information to be collected and made available should definitely include 
personal characteristics (e.g. eye, hair and skin colour, ethnic group, height 
and weight) and medical history. Other respondents suggested additional 
non-identifying information such as interests, likes, dislikes, education, marital 
status and possibly a personal message to their offspring. The possibility of 
updating this information at regular intervals was also proposed. 
• 132 respondents said that identifying information should be made available; 
70 said that it should not and 23 were undecided. 
1 Department of Health, Donor Information Consultation: Providing information about gamete or 
emb1yo donors, London: HMSO, 200 I. 
2 See the DOH website at www.doh.gov.uk/consultations/. 
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Following the publication of these responses, in January 2003, the former Health 
Minister Hazel Blears announced that a pilot voluntary contact register would be 
established for all those who had been involved in AID prior to the enactment of the 
HFEA 1990. This pilot scheme - known as UKDonorLink3 -will run from early 
2004 and will report back to the Department of Health on whether such a scheme 
could be extended to the other individuals in the AID sphere. 
Whilst these measures are welcomed, they represent a very tentative approach to 
the issues raised in this paper and demonstrate that the government has yet to make a 
genuine commitment to practical change. Speaking at the annual HFEA conference, 
Hazel Blears said: 
"We agree that there is a strong argument in principle for children conceived 
using donated sperm, eggs or embryos being able to find out the identity of their 
donor . .. we also understand that at some point in their lives they may decide they 
want to know more about their genetic origins. However, we believe that this 
sensitive area needs further consideration and debate . .. " 
The arguments evinced in this paper have demonstrated that the time is ripe for the 
complete reconsideration of current legal regulation in this area. The evidence 
presented herein has pointed to a strong legal basis for the protection of the identity 
rights of donor offspring and this paper now calls for the enactment of Regulations, if 
not new legislation, to allow donor offspring to be able to exercise their fundamental 
rights to be told about their status and to receive further information about their 
genetic background. It is unjustifiable that secrecy and anonymity are still the norm 
3 
www.UKDonorLink.org.uk. 
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in AID and yet openness now pervades so many other analogous areas of law, both in 
the UK and in other jurisdictions. 
2 The Rights of the Adopted Child - a comparison 
Evidence from adoption circles shows that secrecy and anonymity were prevalent 
in adoption practice in Britain, at least up until 1975,4 if not even after this time.5 
However, adoption legislation has now recognised that adoptees have a right to 
information about their genetic background, in sharp contrast to the current position 
of donor offspring. 6 
An adoption is now registered in the Adopted Child Register/ in a similar way to 
the registration of AID children in the HFE Authority Register of donations resulting 
in a live birth. There is however one fundamental difference: on reaching the age of 
18, an adoptee has the right to obtain a copy of his or her original birth certificate. 8 
This will show the name and place of birth of the biological parents, the mother's 
maiden name and the father's occupation and will often be sufficient to give the 
adoptee a good chance of tracing their parents, or at least their mother. Furthermore, 
the Adoption and Children Act 2002 now allows for the provision of further non-
identifying information in relation to a person's adoption, from either the adoption 
agency or the courts,9 but this will only occur when the child reaches the age of 
4 Children Act 1975, s 26. 
5 Section 39 of the Adoption Act 1976 still provided for the adopted child to be treated in law as the 
legitimate child of the adopting couple, perpetutating the "veil of secrecy" surrounding the adoption. 
See C. Bridge, Changing the Nature of Adoption: Law Reform in England and New Zealand (1993) LS 
81, p82. 
6 Op cit, fn 4. 
7 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 60. 
8 Ibid, s 77. 
9 Section 60. As with AID, the exact nature of this infonnation is to be prescribed by regulations. 
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majority. The question is why the adoptee's right to an identity now receives such 
legal protection whilst the AID offspring is still overlooked? 
Secrecy in adoption was originally maintained in order to protect the adopting 
couples from the shame and stigma of infertility and childlessness, 10 similar to the 
present approach in AID. An adopted child would be "matched" 11 with adopters in, 
for example, physical appearance, intelligence and character, in an attempt to keep up 
the appearance of a "normal " family unit, reminiscent of the reasons for the retention 
of secrecy in AID. 12 The concealment of a child's identity at birth was also designed 
to protect the single birth mother from the shame of an illegitimate birth and to 
prevent her from interfering in the child's life at a later stage, in much the same way 
that donor anonymity today protects all those involved from the embarrassment of 
admitting that the act of masturbation played a part in the process and avoids the 
donor interfering in the AID child's life. However, the changing nature of society 
dictated certain changes in adoption practice. 13 In recent years, there has been a 
significant decline in the number of babies available for adoption, 14 due to an increase 
in the use of contraception, changes to the abortion laws and the erosion of the stigma 
attached to single parenthood. This situation has led to a corresponding increase in 
10 The Adoption Act 1976 was aimed at providing new homes for unwanted babies, generally with 
married couples who were unable to have children of their own, although, "the role played by adoption 
has changed radically over the last three decades·· - The Prime Minister's Review of Adoption, 
Cabinet Office: Pe1fmmance and Innovation Unit, 2000, p 10. 
11 This process of "matching" has been practised by adoption societies in England and Wales since the 
inception of adoption services. 
11 K. O'Donovan, What shall we tell the Children? in R. Lee & D. Morgan, Birthrights, Law and 
Ethics at the Beginnings of Life, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989. 
13 Op cit, Bridge, fn 5; also, N. Lowe, The changing face of adoption- the gift/donation model versus 
the contract/services model [1997] CFLQ 371. 
14 Adoption: The Future ( 1993) Cmnd 2n8, London: HMSO suggests that the number has fallen 
dramatically over the past thirty years. The total number of adoptions fell from approximately 25 000 
in 1968 to just over 7 000 in 1991, of which only 12% were under twelve months old. 
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the number of couples making use of AID techniques - demonstrating that although 
adoption and AID may not be exactly analogous, they are inextricably linked. 15 
Compared to AID, it has generally been considered good practice for a number of 
years that adopted children should know of their adoption from the earliest possible 
time. 16 It is national policy for all adoption agencies to obtain a commitment from 
prospective adopters to tell their children that they are adopted, delivering the 
message that openness is the preferred model - not the case within AID families. 
Also, adoptive parents are given fairly detailed information about their child's 
background for them to pass onto the child. Again, this is miles away from the 
current policies in AID circles; further, this lack of information is apparently one of 
the reasons given by AID parents for not telling their child about the means of their 
conception, given the frustration that may ensue from not being able to access 
additional information. 17 
Today, adoption legislation, policy and practice 18 is based upon the belief that 
there is a "psychological need" to know about one's genetic background for the, 
''formation of a positive concept of self "19 There are no official figures showing 
how many adopted children make enquiries about their birth relatives or make contact 
with them.20 It has been estimated that around 40-50% of adopted people have 
15 A. McWhinnie, AID and Adoption: Some Comparisons A&F 10(1) (1986) 16. McWhinnie suggests 
that the professionals involved in both of these areas would undoubtedly benefit from sharing their 
experiences in order to improve their methods of dealing with the individuals involved, particularly in 
relation to counselling services. 
16 J. Triseliotis, In Search ofOrigins, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, p155. 
17 See further J. Lasker & S. Borg, In search of parenthood: coping with infertility and high-tech 
conception, London: Pandora Press, 1989. 
18 Adoption and Children Act 2002. 
19 J. Triseliotis, Obtaining Birth Certificates in P. Bean (ed), Adoption: Essays in Social Policy, 
London: Tavistock, 1984, pp38-41. 
20 If an adopted person already knows their original name and the agency that placed them, they can 
bypass the official route for access to their original birth certificate, therefore it is impossible to have 
accurate figures in relation to those who do and do not search for their genetic parents. 
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sought background information or contact with a birth relative. 21 However, there are 
few studies regarding the numbers and characteristics of the people who search for 
information relating to their background. Although Triseliotis did find that the need 
for information and/or contact was often felt by adoptees who had not been given 
sufficient information about their origins, or those who had gone through a major 
crisis or life-changing event22 - characteristics that could almost certainly apply to 
some AID children. 
There are however differences between adoption and AID. Adoption involves 
finding parents for children who already exist - it is primarily seen as being child-
orientated and as having a childcare function; assisted reproduction is generally 
viewed as creating children for prospective parents. Also, within adoption there will 
be no genetic link with either social parent; often within AID, there is a genetic link 
with at least one parent, except in cases of embryo donation. With adoption there 
may be some early bonding with the genetic father; in AID there can never be any 
such bonding process. In adoption, social motherhood and genetic motherhood are 
always separate; in AID, except in cases of full surrogacy, the social mother will 
generally carry the donor offspring throughout pregnancy, providing the opportunity 
for early bonding. Another important difference is that the adoptee must often come 
to terms with the fact that they were relinquished by their biological mother. This 
may be a complicating factor in the adoptee's motivation to find out their genetic 
origins, because they want to find the answer to the question -"why was l given up?" 
In AID, the opposite is true- an AID child is always very much wanted long before 
they are born. Being told the truth about their conception at an early age ensures that 
they will know this and they will never have to come to terms with the knowledge of 
21 J. Feast & D. Howe, Adopted adults who search for background information and contact with birth 
relatives (1997) 12 A&F 8. 
21 Op cit, Triseliotis, fu 16. 
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apparent rejection, unlike adoptees. However, this does not mean that the 
"psychological need" to know about their genetic origins may not be as great as that 
of adoptees. Their genetic background is still a missing piece of their "genealogical 
jigsaw puzzle" and it seems logical to suppose that, if information about genetic 
background forms an important part of one child's identity, i.e. the adoptee, this could 
very well be the case for AID children. 
To conclude, it seems wholly inconsistent to draw an analogy between adoptees 
and AID children and then go on to argue for the rights of adopted children but 
against the rights of children born by AID. Indeed, as Haimes acknowledges, 
"[A}rtificial reproduction could learn from the omissions and mistakes of adoption 
rather than simply accepting that the problems of secrecy in adoption have been 
resolved. "23 However, it has been accepted that the sensitivity of the issues involved 
in AID may present problems not encountered within adoption circles. Therefore, 
whilst adoption may provide some useful guidelines for the future regulation of the 
AID child's right to an identity, it may not provide a complete solution. 
3 The Rights of the Australian A.I.D Child - a model for the UK? 
It is therefore proposed that the UK government might benefit from looking to 
other, perhaps more liberal, jurisdictions on the way forward for British donor 
offspring - in particular Australian legislation. Three of the eight Australian states 
and territories now have legislation relating to assisted reproduction, but all states are 
covered by guidelines issued by the N a tiona! Health and Medical Research Council 
23 E. Haimes, Secrecy: What can artificial reproduction learn from adoption? IJLF (1988) 48. 
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(NHMRC),24 which contain an explicit commitment to supporting the right of AID 
children, "to knowledge of their biological parents. "25 However, it is the state of 
Victoria that seems to have taken the most dynamic approach to these issues. It was 
the first in the world to regulate the assisted reproductive technologies (ART's) by 
enacting the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, following the 
recommendations of the Waller Committee report in 1982.26 The Waller Committee 
concluded that, "it should be possible for everyone to discover their origins, "27 
although it acknowledged that the DI child's social parents could not be forced either 
to tell their child about the nature of their conception or to provide information about 
the donor. 28 However, considering that the Waller Committee was compiling its 
report at approximately the same time as the Warnock Committee in the UK,29 the 
differences in tone are quite astounding. The 1984 Act went on to provide that AID 
children should be allowed to receive non-identifying information about the donor, 
again in stark contrast to the HFEA 1990 that ensued from the Warnock Report. 
Following a review of the 1984 Act,30 the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 was 
passed31 and it is proposed that this progressive piece of legislation could be used as a 
model for the UK. The Act contains several explicit guiding principles -
highlighting many of the concerns touched upon in this paper. The most important is 
that, "the welfare and interest of any person born or to be born as a result of a 
treatment procedure are paramount" (emphasis added). 32 The other being, in 
24 Established by the National Health and Medical Research Council Act 1996. 
25 Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproductive Technology (AGPS) NHMRC 1996, para 8.5. 
26 Chaired by Professor Louis Waller. 
27 Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro Fertilisation, 
Report on Donor Gametes in IVF (CCSELIAIVF) 1982, para 3.29. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Cmnd 9414, London: HMSO, 1984. 
3° Conducted by the Standing Review and Advisory Committee on Infertility (SRACI). 
31 Becoming effective on 1 1 anuary 1998. 
32 Section 5(1)(a) Infertility Treatment Act (Vic). 
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descending order of importance: the preservation of human life, consideration of the 
interests of the family as a whole and the proposition that infertile couples should be 
respected and aided in their attempts to conceive. 
Most important of all within the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 are its provisions 
relating to the D I child's right of access to information. A central register of 
information of all AID births is maintained by the Infertility Treatment Authority; a 
voluntary register is also maintained to provide an intermediary link between children 
by donation and their donors and donor families. Following the 1984 Act's provision 
allowing access to non-identifying information, the 1995 Act now allows for the DI 
child's access to identifying information once they reach the age of 18,33 although 
they must first be offered counselling. 34 This provision, however, is not 
retrospective, therefore only applies to DI children born since the 1995 Act came into 
effect in 1998.35 Despite this, the Victoria legislation appears much more liberal and 
child-orientated than anything we have so far experienced in the UK in relation to 
AID. 
The Infertility Treatment Act 1995 also attempts to consider the position of all of 
the parties involved in the AID process. Provisions in the Act ensure that donors are 
encouraged to consider the implications of their donations and the possibility of future 
contact with the donor offspring, by requiring both donors and their possible spouses 
to consent to the donation;36 to receive counselling before they do consent37 and to 
33 Op cit, fn 32, s 79( 1 )(b). 
34 Ibid, s 80. Once the donor offspring applies for such information, the Infertility Treatment Authority 
must make attempts to contact the donor to make them aware of this and also suggest counselling for 
them regarding the implications of this type of situation. 
35 Identifying information can be provided on a retrospective basis where the donor consented to being 
identified before the enactment of the new legislation. See further H. Szoke, Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in I. Freckelton & K. Petersen (eds), Controversies in Health Law The 
Federation Press, 1999, p254. 
36 Sections 12 and 13 Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic). 
37 Ibid, s 16. 
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recetve advice about their rights of the AID children with regard to information 
0 h 0 d 0 38 concemmg t etr onat10n. 
However, disappointingly, the right of the Dl child to be told about their status is 
not enshrined within the Victoria legislation, further demonstrating the difficult and 
sensitive nature of the proposition of state intervention into what is essentially 
regarded by many as the private family sphere. The Victoria legislation does make 
some effort to redress the balance between the social parent and the donor offspring. 
Within the Act, there is provision to allow donors and recipients the right to obtain 
non-identifying information about each other from the Infertility Treatment 
Authority's central register and identifying information can also be made available if 
either party consents. Therefore, there is at least the possibility that children by 
donation may receive both types of information before they reach the age of 18 but 
only if: a) the donor has consented; b) their social parents requested the information 
before their infertility treatment and c) their social parents choose to pass on this 
information to their child. There is still no legislative mechanism to compel social 
parents to inform their AID child about the nature of their conception and, as 
demonstrated in chapters 2 and 3, this right to be told of their status is a wholly 
necessary concomitant of the AID child's right to receive information. Therefore, 
despite the apparently liberal and progressive nature and focus of the Victoria 
legislation, perhaps it still does not go far enough. 
38 Ibid, s 17. 
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4 The Way Forward? 
Therefore, in conclusion, this paper would make the following recommendations, 
all of which can be justified by reference to the arguments that have been put forward 
in the preceding chapters. 
• The UK govemment should enact Regulations to provide more genealogical 
information to donor offspring than is currently available.39 
• The non-identifying information currently held in the HFE Authority's 
Register should be made available to donor offspring applying to the 
Authority, as soon as possible in the near future (given that the first AID 
babies bom since 1991 will now be aged 12 and approaching a critical stage in 
their psychological development). However, this information should only be 
made available when they are considered to be sufficiently mature to 
assimilate the implications of disclosure. This decision could be undertaken, 
with the input of the social parents, by at least two people with professional 
expertise in these matters, for example the donor offspring's GP, a social 
worker, health visitor and/or someone with experience in child psychology. 
• The non-identifying information to be collected from future donors should be 
made available to donor offspring during childhood, again when they are 
considered to be sufficiently mature. 
• The range of donor non-identifying information currently collected by the 
HFE Authority should be extended to cover more personal background 
information. The Authority should encourage licensed clinics to inform 
39 HFEA s 31(3)(a). 
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donors that this information can be updated whenever they so choose and 
should facilitate their attempts to do so. 
e Completion of all parts of the donor information form should be made a 
compulsory part of donation and the donor should not be allowed to veto 
disclosure of any aspect of this information. The importance of the 
completion of the form should be stressed to the donor before they consent to 
the donation, through advice and counselling. The possibility of this 
counselling also being a compulsory part of the donation process should be 
considered before Regulations are enacted. 
• The payment of donors should be prohibited (payment for reasonable expenses 
should still be available). The HFE Authority should continue to examine 
ways in which more altruistic donors could be recruited. 
• The number of times that one donor's gametes can be used in fertility 
treatments should be limited; possibly this number could be agreed between 
each individual donor and the clinic but it is suggested that usage should 
certainly not exceed 5 occasions. 
• Identifying information should also be made to prospective donor offspring 
in the future, before they reach the age of majority, again once they are 
considered to be sufficiently mature. This should not be dependent upon the 
donor consenting to such information being made available and this should be 
explained to the donor at the time of their donation. 
• A voluntary information exchange/contact register should be made available 
for all social parents, donors, donor families and donor offspring born both 
before and after the inception of the HFEA 1990. This could be established in 
new legislation and could be overseen by the HFE Authority on the basis that 
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they have the relevant expertise in collecting such data. Counselling of those 
who would like their details to be placed on this register should feature heavily 
in this process. 
e All of the counselling services provided under the HFEA 1990 and the Code 
of Practice should be extensively reviewed and, where deemed necessary, 
improved for the benefit of all of the individuals involved in the AID process. 
• Despite the government's current refusal to countenance the possibility of 
identifying information being made available on a retrospective basis, it is 
strongly advised that this decision should be seriously reconsidered, on the 
basis that the current legislation breaches the identity rights of the donor 
offspring. 
• Further, although the right of donor offspring to be told of their status did not 
feature in the government's Consultation Paper, it is also proposed that this 
decision be reviewed to allow for changes in legislation and current practice. 
To give practical effect to the DI child's right to genetic background 
information, it is suggested that the government consider measures to protect 
the DI child's right to be told of their status by: 
a) changing the current law on birth certificates to allow for an 
annotation to be made on the certificate drawing attention to 
the AID child's status. 
b) examining the possibility of follow-up visits, for example by 
social workers, health visitors, etc., to the DI family to make 
the social parents aware of the importance of the DI child's 
identity rights and to encourage them to tell their child of the 
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nature of their conception when it is agreed by all that they 
are sufficiently mature. 
c) Improving and increasing the counselling available to the 
social parents, including counselling after the birth of their 
child; possible aspects of this advice and counselling could be 
made a compulsory part of their infertility treatment. 
This paper has therefore sought to examine a number of areas concerning the rights 
of donor offspring that it considers to be ripe for reform - some that the government 
has already chosen to examine, others that it seems to have considered potentially too 
explosive to delve into. However, it is expected that the current inequities in the AID 
sphere will not continue for much longer. At the time of the publication of this 
paper, it has been reported in the national press that a written parliamentary statement 
on identity issues in AID is expected in the very near future. 40 It is anticipated that 
Melanie Johnson, the Public Health Minister will unveil plans to allow children born 
from donated gametes the right to be able to trace their genetic parents. Whether or 
not this report is correct and whether the content of such rights will go as far as has 
been proposed in this paper is as yet uncertain. What is clear is that any moves in 
this are will be welcomed and certainly seen as a step in the right direction for all 
those AID children who feel that they are still searching for the missing piece of their 
"genealogical jigsaw puzzle". 
40 Sperm donor children win right to trace their fathers, The Times, Sat 17 Jan 2004, p 1. 
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